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Article
Abandonments in Bankruptcy:
Unifying Competing Tax
and Bankruptcy Policies
Michelle Arnopol Cecilt
INTRODUCTION
On September 11, 2001, terrorists attacked the World Trade
Center and the Pentagon, resulting in the largest loss of Ameri-
can lives in one day on United States soil.1 Measuring the psycho-
logical impact of the attacks on the United States and its citizens
is likely to prove impossible; however, measuring the economic
impact of the attacks is not. Within six weeks of the attacks, the
aviation industry alone announced layoffs of more than 158,000
workers. Continental Airlines and others predicted that they
would be forced to file for bankruptcy protection if the govern-
ment did not step in to bail out the airline industry in the wake of
the disaster.3 In the weeks and months after the attacks, evi-
t William H. Pittman Professor of Law, University of Missouri-
Columbia School of Law. J.D., B.A., University of Illinois. Research for this
Article was partially funded by grants from the Robert W. Maupin Faculty Re-
search Fellowship. Thanks go to Greta Bassett, Nick Burkemper, Sarah Cole-
man, Laura Krebs, and Jaime Mendez for their invaluable research assis-
tance, and to Cheryl Poelling for her indispensable secretarial assistance.
1. See, e.g., David S. Cloud & Neil King, Death Toll, Source of Devastating
Attacks Remain Unclear; U.S. Vows Retaliation as Attention Focuses on bin
Laden, WALL ST. J., Sept. 12, 2001, at Al.
2. See, e.g., MSNBC Research, Air Transportation-Related Layoffs (Oct. 31,
2001) (on file with author) (establishing that 158,170 workers in the airline and
plane manufacturing industries had been laid off because of the September 1lth
attacks as of October 31, 2001); see also J. Lynn Lunsford & Andy Pasztor, Boe-
ing May Cut as Many as 30,000 Workers, WALL ST. J., Sept. 19, 2001, at A3
("Boeing Co., in the single-largest employment cutback so far stemming from
last week's terrorist attacks, said it may be forced to dismiss by the end of next
year as many as 30,000 people, or nearly 30% of its commercial-aircraft work-
ers.").
3. Laurence Zuckerman, Airlines, in Search of Relief, Warn of Bankruptcy,
723
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dence of their crippling effect on the United States economy was
observed nationwide.4
One significant, albeit not widely reported, outcome of this
national tragedy is its crushing impact on the country's national
bankruptcy system. Several large businesses, including Polaroid,
Bethlehem Steel, and Regal Cinemas, sought protection under
chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code 5 within two months of the
September 11th disaster, and experts predict the massive in-
crease in both consumer and business bankruptcy filings to con-
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 15, 2001, at Al ("[M]ounting losses stemming from this week's
terrorist attacks could force most of the country's major carriers into bank-
ruptcy."); see also Micheline Maynard, Airlines' Bad Year Is Suddenly Looking
Much, Much Worse, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 16, 2001, at C6; Scott McCartney et al.,
Frightened Workers and Investors Buffet Airlines, WALL ST. J., Sept. 18, 2001, at
A3; Robert J. Samuelson, Economic Shockwaves, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 24, 2001, at
54, 54; Allan Sloan, Pork Barrel or a Kick-Start?, NEWSWEEK, Oct. 15, 2001, at
65, 65-66.
4. For example, Vanguard Airlines and U.S. Airways filed for chapter 11
bankruptcy protection within a two-week period in late July and early August of
2002, citing the drop-off in consumer demand for air travel in the wake of the
September 11th attacks as one of the precipitating factors in their decision to file
for bankruptcy. Chris Isidore, US Air to Cut Flights, Staff, CNN, at
httpJ/www.cnn.com/2002/BUSINESS/08/23/usair/index.html (Aug. 23, 2002)
(discussing how US Airways, which fied for bankruptcy protection on August
10, 2002, "was hit particularly hard by the Sept. 11 terrorist attack as its main
hub at Reagan National Airport in Washington, D.C., remained shut for weeks
longer than other airports due to security concerns"); John W. Schoen, More Air-
lines on Path to Bankrupty?, MSNBC, at http://www.msnbc.msn.com/idl
3073074 (Aug. 12, 2002) ("Sept. 11 hit U.S. Airways harder than most of its ri-
vals. While most other airlines were up and running again within a week, U.S.
Airways suffered a prolonged closure of Washington's Reagan National Airport
and the slowdown in travel at its eastern hubs."); Vanguard Airlines to File
Chapter 11, CNN, at http://www.cnn.com/2002frRAVEI1NEWS/07/30/
vanguard.bankruptcy/index.html (July 30, 2002) (noting that Scott Dickson,
chairman, CEO, and president of Vanguard, "partially blamed the post-
September 11 business climate for the airline's demise").
5. Unless otherwise stated, references in this Article to the "Bankruptcy
Code" are to the Bankruptcy Code of 1978, as amended, 11 U.S.C. §§ 1-1330
(2000).
6. Bethlehem Steel Files Chapter 11, BANKR. CT. DECISIONS, Nov. 13,
2001, at A6; Adam Geller, Pensions Fall as Bankruptcies Rise, KAN. CITY STAR,
Nov. 19, 2001, at B6 (discussing the bankruptcy filings of Polaroid and Bethle-
hem Steel); Regal Cinemas, Theater Operator, Files for Bankruptcy, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 13, 2001, at C4; Steelmaker Files for Chapter 11 Bankruptcy, KAN. CITY
STAR, Oct. 16, 2001, at D8. In addition, International Total Services, Inc., one of
the largest airport security companies in the United States, was forced to file for
bankruptcy on October 13, 2001, in the wake of the September 11th terrorist at-
tacks. Large Airport Security Company Files Chapter 11, BANKR. CT. DECISIONS,
Oct. 2, 2001, at A3.
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tinue as the economy slows and consumer confidence wanes. In
fact, in 2002 consumer bankruptcy filings reached an historic
high of 1.5 million new cases, surpassing 2001's record filings by
nearly eight percent.8 As the number of bankruptcy cases rises,
the burden on the already overworked bankruptcy courts will
continue to mount.9 In this situation it is imperative that the
bankruptcy system operate effectively, which is impossible with
so many bankruptcy issues left unanswered. This Article at-
tempts to resolve one such issue: the tax consequences of prop-
erty abandonments by the bankruptcy trustee.
When a debtor files a bankruptcy petition seeking protection
under the Bankruptcy Code, an estate is created automatically."°
All legal and equitable interests of the debtor as of the com-
mencement of the case become property of the bankruptcy estate
by operation of law.1" A trustee is appointed to administer the
bankruptcy estate, primarily for the benefit of unsecured credi-
tors. 2 The trustee must determine whether each item of property
in the bankruptcy estate has value to the estate. Property that is
7. Maureen Milford, Attacks Likely to Spur Chapter 11s, NAT'L L.J., Oct. 1,
2001, at A6 ("Speculation is rampant that certain companies that were wavering
before the attack-companies in the airline, travel, retail, and hotel and hospi-
tality industries-will seek to reorganize in bankruptcy."); Paul Wenske, Bank-
ruptcies Surge Amid Debt, Lost Jobs, KAN. CITY STAR, Dec. 5, 2001, at C1 ("Soar-
ing bankruptcy filings locally and across the country are providing more signs
that the nation's economy is staggering under high consumer debt and rising
layoffs, bankruptcy experts say."); see also Catherine E. Bauer, Can These Laid-
Off Workers Avoid Bankruptcy?, BANKR. CT. DECISIONS, Oct. 16, 2001, at A7
(discussing the financial and mental shock many laid-off workers experience, as
well as the ongoing vulnerability to bankruptcy of many consumers); Laurence
Zuckerman, Some Think United Is Heading for Bankruptcy, KAN. CITY STAR,
Feb. 10, 2002, at F13. In fact, the Administrative Office of the Courts saw a re-
cord number of bankruptcy filings during the twelve-month period ending on
March 31, 2002. Jim Wannamaker, Record Bankruptcy Filings, NABTALK, Fall
2002, at 35, 35.
8. See, e.g., Press Release, Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, Record
Breaking Bankruptcy Filings Reported in Calendar Year 2002 (Feb. 14, 2003),
http://www.uscourts.gov/Press Releases/cy02.pdf.
9. According to the Administrative Office of the Courts, bankruptcy filings
"per authorized judgeship have risen from 2,883 per judgeship in the 12 months
ending March 31, 1993, to 4,644 in March 2002. No new bankruptcy judge-
ships.., have been created since 1992 and, in fact, two of the 326 judgeships
authorized in 1992 have expired." Wannamaker, supra note 7, at 35.
10. 11 U.S.C. § 541(a) (2000).
11. Id.; see also infra notes 54-56 and accompanying text.
12. See 1 DAVID G. EPSTEIN ET AL., BANKRupTcy § 1-4, at 8, § 1-7, at 11
(1992). Generally, it is the duty of the United States trustee to appoint the bank-
ruptcy trustee, but sometimes a committee of creditors can appoint the trustee.
Id. § 1-4, at 8, § 1-7, at 11.
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fully encumbered by liens, for example, will be of no value to the
estate. In such a case, the trustee has the power under the Bank-
ruptcy Code to abandon the property back to the debtor or to an-
other party with a possessory interest in that property." For ex-
ample, if the debtor owns a factory with a fair market value of
$450,000 that is encumbered by a nonrecourse mortgage of
$500,000, the factory has no value to the debtor's unsecured
creditors; therefore, the trustee will abandon the factory either to
the debtor or to the party holding the $500,000 mortgage on it (so
long as the mortgage holder has a possessory interest in the fac-
tory at the time of the abandonment).
The issue that has perplexed the courts is whether the trus-
tee's abandonment of the factory should be a taxable event to the
bankruptcy estate. 4 For example, if the factory has a basis for tax
purposes of $200,000, should the estate be liable for income taxes
owed on the $300,000 gain triggered upon the factory's abandon-
ment, or should the abandonment instead be viewed as a nontax-
able transfer, so that the debtor becomes liable for the income
taxes due on the $300,000 gain when she later sells or disposes of
the factory?1 This issue is governed by both the Bankruptcy Code
and the Tax Code. 6 Although each statute offers some guidance
as to whether an abandonment is a taxable transfer, neither
statute fully resolves this important issue.7 Courts have grappled
13. 11 U.S.C. § 554 (2000). For a more comprehensive discussion of the
trustee's abandonment powers, see infra notes 30-48 and accompanying text.
14. The two leading cases in this area are In re AJ. Lane & Co., 133 B.R.
264 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1991), and Samore v. Olson (In re Olson), 930 F.2d 6 (8th
Cir. 1991) (per curiam). In AJ. Lane, the court held that the trustee's abandon-
ment of an asset to the debtor resulted in taxable gain to the bankruptcy estate.
A.J. Lane, 133 B.R. at 269-70. Conversely, the court in Olson held that an
abandonment did not constitute a taxable transfer and, therefore, resulted in no
gain to the bankruptcy estate. Olson, 930 F.2d at 8. Part II of this Article, infra,
discusses these cases and their progeny in greater detail.
15. For tax purposes, taxable gain is calculated by subtracting an asset's
adjusted basis from the amount realized upon its sale or other disposition. I.R.C.
§ 1001(a) (2000); see also infra note 49 and accompanying text. In this example,
the factory's adjusted basis is $200,000. While the amount realized upon an as-
set's disposition is often its fair market value on the date it is sold or otherwise
disposed of, the Supreme Court has held that if an asset is encumbered by a
nonrecourse liability in excess of the property's fair market value, the amount
realized upon the asset's disposition is equal to the amount of the liability re-
lieved, here $500,000. See Comm'r v. Tufts, 461 U.S. 300, 313 (1983). Thus, the
taxable gain upon the sale or other disposition of the factory will be $300,000
($500,000 amount realized less $200,000 adjusted basis).
16. 11 U.S.C. § 554; I.R.C. § 1398 (2000).
17. For a comprehensive discussion of the Bankruptcy and Tax Code provi-
sions governing abandonments, see infra notes 30-48, 54-62 and accompanying
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with the issue with no greater success.' 8
Although the abandonment issue might sound inconsequen-
tial in comparison to nationally debated bankruptcy issues such
as whether a system of means testing should be adopted to screen
debtors for chapter 7 eligibility'9 and whether credit card debts
should receive preferential treatment in bankruptcy, 20 the taxa-
tion of property abandonments is an issue that lies at the very
heart of the dual policy justifications of bankruptcy: ensuring the
debtor's fresh start2l while providing for a fair and equitable dis-
tribution of assets to creditors.22 A recent empirical study con-
ducted by the Commercial Law League of America estimated
that, over a four-year testing period, the uncertainty over the tax
consequences of property abandonments resulted in nearly
$340,000,000 in assets not being distributed to unsecured credi-
tors. 23 Thus, according to the study, unsecured creditors "are be-
text.
18. See infra notes 63-145 and accompanying text.
19. See, e.g., Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of
2001, H.R. 333, 107th Cong. § 102 (2001); H.R. REP. NO. 107-3, pt. 1, at 461-62
(2001); S. REP. NO. 106-49, at 4-9 (1999); H.R. REP. No. 106-123, pt. 1, at 388-
90 (1999); S. REP. NO. 105-253, at 26 (1998); H.R. REP. NO. 105-540, at 234-40
(1998); see also Ted Janger, Crystals and Mud in Bankruptcy Law: Judicial
Competence and Statutory Design, 43 ARIZ. L. REV. 559, 615-20 (2001); Todd J.
Zywicki, Bankruptcy Law as Social Legislation, 5 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 393, 427-
29 (2001); Rocco I. Debitetto, Comment, Bankruptcy Reform in Light of In-
creased Consumer Filings: Means-Testing Employed to Prevent Long-Run Eco-
nomic Impacts on Consumers and to Cure Debtor Abuse Under the Current
Bankruptcy Code, 69 U. CIN. L. REV. 641 (2001).
20. See, e.g., H.R. 333, § 314; Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1998; Responsible
Borrower Protection Act; and Consumer Lenders and Borrowers Bankruptcy Ac-
countability Act of 1998-Part III: Hearing on H.R. 3150, H.R. 2500, and H.R.
3146 Before the Subcomm. on Commercial and Admin. Law of the House Comm.
on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. 146-47 (1998) (statement of Jeffrey W. Morris,
Professor of Law, University of Dayton School of Law, Representing the Na-
tional Bankruptcy Conference); 146 CONG. REc. S11625-28 (daily ed. Dec. 6,
2000) (statement of Sen. Durbin); Margaret Howard, Shifting Risk and Fixing
Blame: The Vexing Problem of Credit Card Obligations in Bankruptcy, 75 AM.
BANKR. L.J. 63 (2001); Veryl V. Miles, Fairness, Responsibility, and Efficiency in
the Bankruptcy Discharge: Are the Commission's Recommendations Enough?,
102 DICK. L. REV. 795 (1998).
21. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 125 (1977), reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6086 (noting that the fresh start allows debtors "to get out
from under the debilitating effects of too much debt" and that "[tihe two most
important aspects of the fresh start available under the Bankruptcy laws are the
provision of adequate property for a return to normal life, and the discharge,
with the release from creditor collection attempts").
22. See, e.g., Burlingham v. Crouse, 228 U.S. 459, 473 (1913); IRS v. Luongo
(In re Luongo), 259 F.3d 323, 330 (5th Cir. 2001).
23. See Max G. Moses, Proposal for Capital Gains Taxes and Bankruptcy
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ing deprived of a source of funds from which they could recoup
some portion of the billions lost each year to bankrupt debtors."24
A similar study revealed that in over ninety-seven percent of the
bankruptcy proceedings involving secured claims that were in-
cluded in its survey, at least some collateral was abandoned by
the trustee.25
This Article not only resolves the issue of whether the trus-
tee's abandonment of property is a taxable transfer from a strict
statutory construction standpoint, but it also attempts to provide
a more comprehensive solution to the broader issue of who should
bear the burden of the tax imposed on the gain inherent in an as-
set as of the commencement of a bankruptcy proceeding. By way
of background, Part I provides the statutory framework neces-
sary to understand the abandonment issue, examining the rele-
vant provisions of both the Bankruptcy and Tax Codes. In Part II,
the Article addresses the conflicting case law on the issue of
whether an abandonment is a taxable event to the bankruptcy
estate. Because a proper resolution of this issue must necessarily
harmonize bankruptcy and tax policy, Part III examines these
competing policies. Part IV of the Article discusses four other sig-
nificant works that have studied the bankruptcy abandonment
issue in the past. Finally, Part V offers a comprehensive resolu-
tion of the issue, providing a three-pronged approach to the taxa-
tion of property abandonments in a debtor's bankruptcy proceed-
ing. First, it suggests that the debtor should bear the burden of
Cases, 102 COM. L.J. 219, 219-20 (1997) (proposing an amendment to the Inter-
nal Revenue Code "to provide that the trustee in bankruptcy receives a 'stepped
up basis' in property similar to that currently enjoyed by heirs of decedent's es-
tates"). For a more comprehensive discussion of the Commercial Law League's
study, see infra notes 168-76 and accompanying text.
24. Commercial Law League of Am., Impact of Potential Capital Gain Taxes
on the Sale of Assets in Bankruptcy Cases, COM. L. BULL., May-June 1996, at 21,
21.
25. Michael J. Herbert & Domenic E. Pacitti, Down and Out in Richmond,
Virginia: The Distribution of Assets in Chapter 7 Bankruptcy Proceedings Closed
During 1984-1987, 22 U. RICH. L. REv. 303, 312 (1988). The authors clarified
the impact of abandonments on bankruptcy proceedings by stating:
Three of the most striking statistics in this study are the stated
value of abandoned collateral as a percentage of the total collateral
(96.6%), the stated value of abandoned collateral as a percentage of
the stated value of all assets available for distribution (80.9%) and the
stated value of all abandoned and distributed collateral as a percent-
age of the stated value of all assets available for distribution (83.8%).
As large as these percentages are, there is some possibility that they
are actually understated because of unreported abandonments.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
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the tax on the gain inherent in an asset as of the commencement
of the case because it was the debtor who enjoyed the benefits of
the asset's appreciation before bankruptcy. Second, the Article
recognizes that the debtor does not have the cash available to pay
this tax, and thus proposes that the gain should be treated as dis-
charge of indebtedness income. 26 This tax treatment allows the
debtor to postpone paying the tax until he disposes of the asset,
either through sale or foreclosure. Finally, the proposal allows
the debtor to retain his tax attributes, such as net operating
losses,27 to absorb the tax liability arising upon the debtor's dispo-
sition of the asset. The Article concludes that this three-pronged
solution to the bankruptcy abandonment issue harmonizes com-
peting bankruptcy and tax policies, thus bringing the bankruptcy
system one step closer to operating more efficiently and effec-
tively.
I. TAXATION OF ABANDONMENTS:
A STATUTORY FRAMEWORK
Although both the Bankruptcy Code and the Tax Code are
extraordinarily detailed and complex, little attention has been
paid to the intricate interplay between these two massive stat-
utes. 2" Two years after Congress enacted the Bankruptcy Code in
1978, it attempted to resolve many of the thorny income tax is-
sues raised in corporate and individual bankruptcy proceedings
by passing the Bankruptcy Tax Act of 1980.29 While bankruptcy
26. The concept of discharge of indebtedness income is discussed more fully
infra notes 243-58 and accompanying text.
27. For a comprehensive examination of tax attributes, see infra notes 268-
78 and accompanying text.
28. See, e.g., Jack F. Williams, Rethinking Bankruptcy and Tax Policy, 3
AM. BANKR. INST. L. REv. 153, 154 (1995) ("[The interface between bankruptcy
and tax presents a plethora of issues, many of which are ignored in traditional
bankruptcy literature.").
29. Bankruptcy Tax Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-589, 94 Stat. 3389 (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.). The history of the enactment of
the Bankruptcy Tax Act is quite interesting. In the early 1970s Congress ap-
pointed a special commission to review the entire structure of the bankruptcy
laws, which dated back to 1898. See Paul H. Asofsky, Toward a Bankruptcy
Tax Act of 1993, 51 N.Y.U. INST. ON FED. TAx'N § 13.02, at 13-4 (1993). One of
the Commission's consultants was William T. Plumb, Jr., arguably the most in-
fluential bankruptcy tax scholar of the twentieth century. Id. Although the
Commission's report was quite comprehensive and contained a full chapter ad-
dressing topics related to bankruptcy taxation, jurisdictional acrimony between
the House Judiciary Committee, responsible for the bankruptcy laws of the
United States, and the House Ways and Means Committee, responsible for fed-
eral taxation matters, threatened to undermine the entire bankruptcy overhaul
2004]
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practitioners and scholars applauded the Bankruptcy Tax Act as
the most sweeping and comprehensive attempt by Congress in
history to harmonize bankruptcy and tax policy, Congress has
done little since that time to resolve the myriad bankruptcy taxa-
tion issues that have arisen under the modern Bankruptcy Code,
including the taxation of property abandonments by the bank-
ruptcy trustee. This section will establish the statutory frame-
work necessary to understand this challenging issue. It first ex-
amines section 554 of the Bankruptcy Code, which governs
property abandonments in bankruptcy. It then explores section
1398 of the Tax Code, which permits transfers into and out of an
individual's bankruptcy estate to be nontaxable under limited
circumstances.
A. THE BANKRuPTcY CODE: SECTION 554
Under the Bankruptcy Code, the trustee is permitted to
abandon any property that is of inconsequential value to the
30bankruptcy estate, or is otherwise burdensome to the estate.
The primary purpose for permitting abandonment is to "maxi-
mize the estate for the benefit of [the debtor's] creditors."3' The
property can be abandoned to any party that has a possessory in-
terest in the property, including the debtor or a secured creditor.
32
process. See id. § 13.02, at 13-4 to 13-6.
The sponsors of the bankruptcy bill responded to this turf war by remov-
ing all references in the bill to federal taxation matters. Id. § 13.02, at 13-6.
Thus, when Congress enacted a sweeping overhaul of the bankruptcy system
in the Bankruptcy Code in 1978, the bill contained references only to state and
local income tax issues. Id. All federal tax matters were introduced in a sepa-
rate bill, which was given lengthy consideration by the House and Senate
committees responsible for both tax and bankruptcy matters. Id. § 13.02, at
13-6 to 13-7. After extensive testimony and debate, Congress passed the Bank-
ruptcy Tax Act of 1980 on December 13, 1980. Id. § 13.02, at 13-11. For a com-
plete history of the hearings and debate leading up to the passage of the Act,
see id. § 13.02, at 13-4 to 13-14.
30. 11 U.S.C. § 554(a) (2000); see also S. REP. No. 95-989, at 92 (1978), re-
printed in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5878. For a history of the judicial develop-
ment of the concept of abandonment prior to the enactment of the Bankruptcy
Code, see C. RICHARD MCQUEEN & JACK F. WILLIAMS, TAX ASPECTS OF
BANKRUPTCY LAW AND PRACTICE § 24:6 (3d ed. 1997).
31. Terjen v. Santoro (In re Terjen), 154 B.R. 456, 458 (E.D. Va. 1993), affd,
30 F.3d 131 (4th Cir. 1994) (unpublished table decision). In addition, the aban-
donment provision serves to "provide for the orderly and efficient reduction of
the bankrupt's debts." In re Nevin, 135 B.R. 652, 654 (Bankr. D. Haw. 1991)
(mem.) (quoting In re Olson, 121 B.R. 346, 348 (N.D. Iowa 1990), affd, 930 F.2d
6 (8th Cir. 1991) (per curiam)).
32. S. REP. No. 95-989, at 92; H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 378 (1977), reprinted
in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6333. A possessory interest includes the "right to
730
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The trustee must notify all creditors and creditors' committees, as
well as the United States trustee, of the proposed abandonment.
3
If the trustee fails to seek abandonment of property in a situation
in which the property is burdensome or of inconsequential value
to the estate, another party in interest may request that the
bankruptcy court order the trustee to do so." Once made, an
abandonment is irrevocable, even if the property subsequently
increases in value or was improperly undervalued at the time the
trustee abandoned the property.5 A proper abandonment will re-
late back to the commencement of the case, and title to the aban-
doned property will revest in the debtor as though the estate
never owned it.36 The bankruptcy court, however, retains jurisdic-
tion over the abandoned property so that it can decide bank-
control property, including the right to exclude others, by a person who is not
necessarily the owner" as well as a "right to the exclusive use and possession of
property." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1185 (7th ed. 1999). Several courts have
determined that section 554, together with its legislative history, requires the
trustee to abandon property to the party that holds the superior possessory in-
terest in it. See, e.g., In re Popp, 166 B.R. 697, 700 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1993) (mem.);
Riggs Nat'l Bank of Wash., D.C. v. Perry (In re Perry), 29 B.R. 787, 793 (D. Md.
1983), affd, 729 F.2d 982 (4th Cir. 1984); In re Cruseturner, 8 B.R. 581, 591
(Bankr. D. Utah 1981).
33. See FED. R. BANKR. P. 6007(a); see also Sierra Switchboard Co. v. West-
inghouse Elec. Corp., 789 F.2d 705, 709-10 (9th Cir. 1986) (concluding that a
trustee's abandonment is ineffective without proper notice). If a party in interest
objects to the trustee's proposed abandonment, the bankruptcy court will hold a
hearing to determine whether abandonment is appropriate. FED. R. BANKR. P.
6007(a). In a case in which no objections are raised to the proposed abandon-
ment, it can take place without a hearing and court order. See In re Trim-X, Inc.,
695 F.2d 296, 300 (7th Cir. 1982); In re Wilson, 94 B.R. 886, 888 (Bankr. E.D.
Va. 1989); Hickman v. First State Bank of Cordele (In re Motley), 10 B.R. 141,
146 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 1981).
34. 11 U.S.C. § 554(b) (2000); see also FED. R. BANKR. P. 6007(b). If a party
in interest files a motion asking that the court compel the trustee to abandon
estate property, the court must hold a hearing on the motion. See FED. R.
BANKR. P. 6007(a). The trustee's act of filing a "no-asset" report in a chapter 7
case does not rise to the level of an abandonment under the Bankruptcy Code.
See Figlio v. Am. Mgmt. Servs., Inc. (In re Figlio), 193 B.R. 420, 423 n.2 (Bankr.
D.N.J. 1996); David S. Kennedy & R. Spencer Clift, III, The Mere Filing of the
Chapter 7 Trustee's "No-Asset" Report Does Not Constitute an "Abandonment" of
Estate Property Under Section 554(a) of the Bankruptcy Code and Federal Rule
of Bankruptcy Procedure 6007, 11 J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. 347, 352-53 (2002).
35. See In re Brio Ref., Inc., 86 B.R. 487, 490 (N.D. Tex. 1988) (mem.); Wal-
lace v. Enriquez (In re Enriquez), 22 B.R. 934, 935-36 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1982)
(mem.); In re Sutton, 10 B.R. 737, 739-40 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1981); see also 15
MYRON M. SHEINFELD ET AL., COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY I TX2.03[1] [b] [iv] (Alan
N. Resnick & Henry J. Sommer eds., 15th ed., rev. 2003).
36. Nevin, 135 B.R. at 653 (citing Mason v. Comm'r, 68 T.C. 163 (1977),
affd, 646 F.2d 1309 (9th Cir. 1980) (per curiam)).
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ruptcy-related issues, such as violations of the automatic stay
with respect to the abandoned property and the dischargeability
of debts encumbering the property.
37
The right to abandonment is not absolute, however.38 For ex-
ample, in one case the trustee attempted to abandon a toxic
waste site as burdensome to the bankruptcy estate.39 The Su-
preme Court refused to permit the proposed abandonment be-
cause it would have violated state laws enacted to protect public
health and safety. ° Accordingly, the Court held that restrictions
on the trustee's abandonment power can be created if such re-
strictions protect important federal and state interests.
The classic scenario in which the bankruptcy trustee will
seek to abandon property as burdensome or of inconsequential
value to the estate is when the property is encumbered by a li-
ability in excess of its fair market value.42 For example, assume
that a debtor owns a car worth $10,000 that is subject to a valid
lien of $15,000. If the debtor files for chapter 7 bankruptcy pro-
tection, the car will become property of the bankruptcy estate by
operation of law.43 Because there is no value in the car for unse-
cured creditors, however, the trustee will almost certainly seek to
abandon the property pursuant to section 554 of the Bankruptcy
Code.' Moreover, even if the lien in the foregoing example were
37. See, e.g., Dunmore v. United States (In re Dunmore), 254 B.R. 761, 763
(Bankr. N.D. Cal. 2000) (mem.); In re Shields, 24 B.R. 219, 220 (Bankr. S.D.
Ohio 1982); Bennett v. Commercial Credit Plan (In re Bennett), 13 B.R. 643, 645
(Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1981); see also Todd Johnson, Note, Two Codes Collide: Is
Abandoning Property by a Chapter 7 Trustee a Tax Recognition Event for the
Bankruptcy Estate?, 14 J. CORP. L. 687, 711 (1989).
38. In re Pilz Compact Disc, Inc., 229 B.R. 630, 641 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1999)
(mem.).
39. Midlantic Nat'l Bank v. N.J. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 474 U.S. 494, 497-98
(1986).
40. Id. at 507. For a comprehensive discussion of this public policy exception
to abandonments carved out by Midlantic, see Joseph S. Maniscalco, Note, At
the Crossroads of Environmental Laws and the Bankruptcy Code: Abandonment
and Trustee Personal Liability, 23 HOFSTRA L. REV. 879, 895-903 (1995).
41. Midlantic, 474 U.S. at 506-07.
42. See, e.g., In re Burpo, 148 B.R. 918, 919 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1993) (trustee
abandoned thirteen tracts of real estate as burdensome to the bankruptcy estate
because they were encumbered by mortgage liens in excess of their fair market
value).
43. See 11 U.S.C. § 541 (2000).
44. The timing of the tax consequences of the proposed abandonment will
differ depending on whether the trustee abandons the car to the debtor or in-
stead to the secured creditor. For a complete discussion of this issue, see infra
notes 45-53 and accompanying text.
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only $8000, if the debtor were entitled to an automobile exemp-
tion of $2000 or more, as would be the case if the debtor used the
federal bankruptcy exemption scheme,45 the trustee would again
abandon the car as of inconsequential value to the bankruptcy es-
tate because the secured creditor's lien of $8000, together with
the debtor's automobile exemption of $2000, absorb all of the
value in the car, leaving nothing for the unsecured creditors.
One issue that has perplexed courts since the enactment of
the Bankruptcy Code in 1978 is whether the trustee can use his
power of abandonment to avoid incurring income tax liability on
built-in gains inherent in estate property.46 For example, assume
that a debtor purchases Blackacre for $10,000 in 1975. In 2001,
the debtor, an airplane mechanic, is laid off from her job because
of economic distress in the airline industry. At the time of her
layoff, Blackacre is worth $80,000. She borrows $60,000 from a
local bank to make ends meet, using Blackacre as collateral for
the loan. Unfortunately, as bills continue to mount with no pros-
pects of employment in sight, the debtor is forced to file for chap-
ter 7 bankruptcy protection in 2002, with Blackacre becoming
property of the estate by operation of law.47 The trustee attempts
to abandon Blackacre as burdensome to the estate, arguing that,
if the trustee were to sell the property instead of abandoning it,
after the secured creditor's $60,000 claim is paid, the $20,000 of
remaining equity would be insufficient to pay income taxes on the
$70,000 gain inherent in the property.
Courts that have considered this issue have reached conflict-
ing results, largely because the provisions of the Internal Reve-
nue Code governing the tax consequences of abandonments do
not squarely address the issue. Thus, before discussing the con-
flicting case law on the tax consequences of abandonments in
bankruptcy, it is necessary to examine the relevant provisions of
the Internal Revenue Code.4
B. SECTION 1398 OF THE TAx CODE
It is a fundamental notion of federal income tax law that
when a taxpayer sells appreciated property, she realizes a gain
45. 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(2) (2000).
46. For a comprehensive discussion of the conflicting case law on this issue,
see infra notes 63-145 and accompanying text.
47. See infra notes 55-56 and accompanying text.
48. References to the Internal Revenue Code refer to the Internal Revenue
Code of 1986, as amended, unless otherwise noted. This Article will often refer to
the Internal Revenue Code as the Tax Code.
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for tax purposes equal to the difference between the amount that
she realizes on the sale and the adjusted basis of the property
transferred. 9 This realized gain must be recognized, or included
in the taxpayer's gross income, in the year of the sale unless a
specific provision of the Tax Code permits the taxpayer to defer
recognizing the gain until a later time. °
If, instead of selling appreciated property, the taxpayer
transfers the property to a creditor in satisfaction of a liability,
this disposition also constitutes a realization event. Accordingly,
the taxpayer must include any built-in gain inherent in the prop-
erty in gross income in the year of the transfer.5' Similarly, courts
have held that an abandonment of property by a taxpayer trig-
gers the recognition of gain,52 as does a foreclosure of property by
49. See I.R.C. § 1001(a) (2000). The amount realized on the sale consists of
the amount of cash received, the fair market value of property and services re-
ceived, and any liabilities paid or otherwise assumed by the transferee on the
sale. See id. § 1001(b); Comm'r v. Tufts, 461 U.S. 300, 312-13 (1983); Diedrich v.
Comm'r, 457 U.S. 191, 197-99 (1982); Crane v. Comm'r, 331 U.S. 1, 14 (1947).
The taxpayer's adjusted basis is determined by reference to I.R.C. §§ 1011-1023
(2000). For a more complete discussion of the concepts of amount realized and
adjusted basis, see BORIS I. BITrKER ET AL., FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF
INDIVIDUALS 29.01-.17 (3d ed. 2002).
50. I.R.C. § 1001(c) (2000). Provisions allowing the taxpayer to defer the
recognition of gain are referred to as nonrecognition provisions. See, e.g., id.
§ 453 (governing installment sales); id. § 1031 (governing like-kind exchanges).
Similarly, if a taxpayer sells depreciated property, any loss realized on the
sale can be recognized, or deducted from the taxpayer's gross income, unless a
nonrecognition provision applies. See id. § 165. There are, however, several
limitations on the deductibility of losses. For example, the Tax Code only per-
mits the deductibility of losses incurred in the taxpayer's trade or business, in
a transaction entered into for profit (such as investment losses), and upon the
occurrence of a casualty. See id. § 165(c). Thus, losses from the sale of personal
use property, such as a pleasure boat or the taxpayer's automobile, are not de-
ductible. In addition, losses from the sale of capital assets are deductible only
to the extent of the taxpayer's capital gains for the year (plus up to $3000 of
ordinary income in the case of individuals). See id. § 1211. Because the issue of
the tax consequences of abandonments in bankruptcy arises almost exclu-
sively in the case of appreciated property, this Article will focus on gain rather
than loss property. The analysis, however, would be identical in the case of
depreciated property, except that any loss triggered by the disposition of loss
property in bankruptcy might not be deductible for tax purposes because of the
limitations outlined above.
51. See, e.g., Intl Freighting Corp. v. Comm'r, 135 F.2d 310, 313 (2d Cir.
1943).
52. See Yarbro v. Comm'r, 737 F.2d 479, 486 (5th Cir. 1984) (holding an
abandonment of property by the taxpayer constitutes a taxable exchange);
Middleton v. Comm'r, 77 T.C. 310, 320-21 (1981), affd, 693 F.2d 124 (11th Cir.
1982) (per curiam).
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a secured creditor. 3
When a debtor files for bankruptcy protection under the
Bankruptcy Code, 54 an estate is created by operation of law.55 The
estate is composed of all of the debtor's pre-petition property,
with certain very limited exceptions.56 If the bankruptcy trustee
sells appreciated property that is part of the estate to satisfy the
claims of creditors, the estate must include any built-in gain in-
herent in the property in gross income under the general rules of
taxation outlined above. Moreover, if the trustee transfers en-
53. Cf Helvering v. Hammel, 311 U.S. 504, 510-11 (1941) (concluding that
losses from involuntary sales and voluntary sales are treated equally); see also
Electro-Chem. Engraving Co. v. Comm'r, 311 U.S. 513, 514 (1941) (same). In-
deed, the Supreme Court has held that even a foreclosure on a nonrecourse
mortgage results in the recognition of gain by the owner of the property.
Helvering v. Neb. Bridge Supply & Lumber Co., 312 U.S. 666, 667 (1941).
54. Although individual debtors generally file for bankruptcy relief under
either chapter 7 or chapter 13, the Supreme Court has held that they are also
entitled to file a bankruptcy petition under chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code,
which generally governs corporate reorganizations. Toibb v. Radloff, 501 U.S.
157, 166 (1991). Because chapter 11 reorganizations are very time consuming
and expensive relative to chapter 7 or chapter 13, however, it is rare for an indi-
vidual debtor to choose chapter 11 over the other two types of bankruptcy pro-
ceedings. See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 6 (1977), reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 5968 ("The procedures of chapter 11... are sufficiently bur-
densome that their use will only make sense in the business context, and not in
the consumer context."). A recent empirical study, however, concluded that indi-
viduals owning businesses may be filing chapter 11 petitions in greater numbers
than originally anticipated. Elizabeth Warren & Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Fi-
nancial Characteristics of Businesses in Bankruptcy, 73 AM. BANKR. L.J. 499,
501 (1999) (finding that individuals, not corporate entities, filed one-quarter of
chapter 11 business bankruptcies).
55. 11 U.S.C. § 541 (2000).
56. See id. § 541(b), (c)(2).
57. See, e.g., Waldschmidt v. Comm'r (In re Lambdin), 33 B.R. 11, 12-13
(Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1983) (mem.). The tax paid on the gain will constitute an
administrative expense of the bankruptcy estate, and will accordingly be
granted a first priority in bankruptcy. In re Swann, 149 B.R. 137, 146 (Bankr.
D.S.D. 1993) (mem.); S. REP. No. 95-989, at 66 (1978), reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5852; see also 11 U.S.C. §§ 503(b)(1)(B), 507(a)(1) (2000). If a
tax liability generated by the estate during the pendency of the bankruptcy pro-
ceeding is not paid by the estate, such liability does not revert back to the debtor
when the estate terminates. 6 WILLIAM L. NORTON, JR., NORTON BANKRUPTCY
LAW AND PRACTICE 2D § 128:12, at 128-15 (1997).
It is important to note that the estate will only be treated as a separate
taxable entity in the case of individual debtors filing for bankruptcy protection
under chapter 7 or 11 of the Bankruptcy Code. I.R.C. § 1398 (2000). In all
other cases, the bankruptcy estate is not treated as a taxable entity separate
and apart from the debtor. Id. § 1399. Thus, the discussion contained in this
section applies primarily in the case of individual debtors filing for chapter 7
bankruptcy relief, as most individual debtors file for bankruptcy protection
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cumbered property to a secured creditor in full or partial satisfac-
tion of the creditor's claim, or if the secured creditor forecloses on
encumbered property while it is property of the bankruptcy es-
tate, the estate is liable for income tax on any gain inherent in
the property at the time of the transfer or foreclosure. 8
The issue that is currently unresolved is whether the trustee
is liable for paying taxes on the gain inherent in appreciated
property if the trustee abandons the property to the debtor pur-
suant to section 554 of the Bankruptcy Code during the admini-
stration of the estate. 9 In other words, is bankruptcy abandon-
ment a realization event for federal income tax purposes?
The Tax Code deals only briefly with the tax consequences of
transfers into and out of the bankruptcy estate. Section 1398 of
the Tax Code provides that "[a] transfer (other than by sale or ex-
change) of an asset from the debtor to the estate shall not be
treated as a disposition for purposes of any provision of this title
assigning tax consequences to a disposition."60 Thus, when a
debtor files a bankruptcy petition and his pre-petition property is
transferred to the bankruptcy estate by operation of law, the
transfer is not treated as a sale or other disposition for income
tax purposes; therefore, the debtor realizes no gain or loss as a
result of the transfer.
Similarly, the Tax Code provides that "[i]n the case of a ter-
mination of the estate, a transfer (other than by sale or exchange)
of an asset from the estate to the debtor shall not be treated as a
disposition for purposes of any provision of this title assigning tax
consequences to a disposition." Therefore, upon the termination
of the estate at the close of the bankruptcy proceeding, any prop-
erty remaining in the estate that reverts back to the debtor by
operation of law will not trigger a realization event; hence, the es-
tate will not be taxed on any gain or loss inherent in estate prop-
under either chapter 7 or chapter 13 rather than chapter 11. See supra note
54. Yet even though the tax discussion included in this section currently ap-
plies only in the case of individuals seeking chapter 7 or 11 relief, the problem
is, in fact, much broader. Accordingly, the solution crafted in Part V of this Ar-
ticle, infra, encompasses not only individual debtors, but corporate debtors as
well. In addition, the solution is broad enough to cover individual debtors
seeking chapter 12 or 13 bankruptcy relief.
58. See, e.g., Jack F. Williams, The Tax Consequences of Abandonment Un-
der the Bankruptcy Code, 67 TEMP. L. REV. 13, 40-41 (1994).
59. For a comprehensive discussion of the conflicting case law on this issue,
see infra notes 63-145 and accompanying text.
60. I.R.C. § 1398(f)(1).
61. Id. § 1398(f)(2).
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erty at the time of the reversion. 2 It is unclear, however, whether
an abandonment of property by the trustee back to the debtor
during the bankruptcy proceeding constitutes a transfer for tax
purposes. Conflicting case law on this important bankruptcy is-
sue is discussed in the section that follows.
II. CONFLICTING CASE LAW ON THE TAXATION
OF ABANDONMENTS
Whether the trustee's abandonment of property back to the
debtor during the bankruptcy proceeding is a taxable event
turns on courts' interpretation of the phrase "in the case of a
termination of the estate" in section 1398(f)(2) of the Tax Code.
If that phrase is broad enough to include abandonments occur-
ring during the administration of the estate, then an abandon-
ment of property by the trustee will not constitute a taxable
event, and the bankruptcy estate will not be liable for taxes on
any built-in gain inherent in the property at the time of the
abandonment. Conversely, if abandonments during the bank-
ruptcy proceeding are not included within the ambit of section
1398(f)(2), then the trustee's abandonment of property to the
debtor will be a taxable event, and the estate will be liable for
income tax on any gain inherent in the property.
A. ABANDONMENTS TREATED AS TRANSFERS FOR TAX PURPOSES
The leading case holding that an abandonment of property
by the bankruptcy trustee to the debtor during the administra-
tion of the bankruptcy estate results in taxable gain to the estate
is In re A.J. Lane & Co.63 In A.J. Lane, the debtor, Andrew J.
Lane, filed a bankruptcy petition under chapter 11 of the Bank-
ruptcy Code. 4 At the time of the filing, Lane owned three com-
mercial apartment complexes in Massachusetts. 6 All three prop-
erties were subject to encumbrances in excess of their fair market
value. 66 A creditor holding the liens on the complexes sought and
was granted relief from the automatic stay to proceed with fore-
closure sales of the properties.
62. See, e.g., In re Rubin, 154 B.R. 897, 899-900 (Bankr. D. Md. 1992)
(mem.).
63. 133 B.R. 264 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1991).
64. Id. at 266.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 267.
67. Id. at 266.
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The chapter 11 trustee sought to abandon the properties as
burdensome to the estate because the three properties together
had a built-in gain of $40.9 million, as their fair market value
was estimated at $53 million and they had a combined adjusted
basis of $12.1 million."8 If the foreclosure sales occurred while the
complexes were still property of the debtor's bankruptcy estate,
the estate would incur an income tax liability of $3.27 million.6 9
The debtor opposed the trustee's motion seeking abandonment of
the properties, and filed an ancillary motion seeking a court de-
termination of who should bear the burden of the tax conse-
quences of the foreclosure sales even if the trustee's request for
abandonment was granted." The debtor argued that, if the court
permitted the trustee to abandon the properties back to the
debtor, the estate would nonetheless remain liable for the taxes
on the gain inherent in the properties because the abandonment
itself would constitute a taxable event.71
The court first addressed whether it had the authority to de-
cide which party would be liable for the income taxes inherent in
the property if the trustee was permitted to abandon it to the
debtor prior to foreclosure.72 It concluded that it did hold this au-
thority for two reasons. First, the court noted that the Internal
Revenue Service ("Service") had previously issued a private letter
68. Id.
69. Id. The actual tax liability resulting from the sales was approximately
$13 million; however, the estate succeeded to the debtor's tax attributes, includ-
ing his net operating losses, upon commencement of the case. Id. at 272. There-
fore, the estate could offset nearly $10 million of its tax liability with these net
operating losses, but would still have been liable for $3.27 million in taxes. See
id.; see also I.R.C. § 1398(g) (2000) (providing that the estate succeeds to the
debtor's tax attributes at the commencement of the case). For a comprehensive
discussion of the concept of net operating losses and their value in bankruptcy,
see Michelle M. Arnopol, Why Have Chapter 11 Bankruptcies Failed So Misera-
bly? A Reappraisal of Congressional Attempts to Protect a Corporation's Net Op-
erating Losses After Bankruptcy, 68 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 133 (1992).
70. AJ. Lane, 133 B.R. at 267. The debtor based his request on section
505(a) of the Bankruptcy Code, id., which authorizes a court to establish the
parties' relative tax liabilities in a bankruptcy proceeding, see 11 U.S.C. § 505(a)
(2000).
71. A.J. Lane, 133 B.R. at 267.
72. Id. at 272. After the court held a hearing on the abandonment issue, but
before it reached a decision or the foreclosure sales occurred, the debtor and the
trustee were able to refinance the mortgages on two of the three apartment com-
plexes. Id. at 266. Therefore, the foreclosures of these properties were discontin-
ued, and the trustee accordingly withdrew his motion to abandon those two prop-
erties. Id. at 267. The third complex could not be refinanced, however. Id. Thus,
the bankruptcy court faced the same issue, but with less dire tax ramifications
than originally considered. See id. at 266-67.
738 [Vol 88:723
ABANDONMENTS IN BANKRUPTCY
ruling establishing its view that abandonment of property by a
bankruptcy trustee was not a taxable event.73 If the court did not
decide the tax issue in the case before it, the trustee would seek a
determination from the Service after the abandonment took place
that the estate should not be liable for any gain inherent in the
abandoned property because the abandonment did not constitute
a transfer, and therefore was not taxable.74 Because the Service
and the trustee shared a common view regarding the tax treat-
ment of abandonments, the court reasoned that the debtor's
views would not be adequately addressed in such a proceeding, to
the debtor's prejudice. 5 Accordingly, the court found that it was
the proper authority to determine the issue.6 Moreover, the court
stated that "economy in judicial and legal resources dictate that
the tax question be adjudicated now; it has been briefed and ar-
gued."
77
Having established itself as the proper tribunal to determine
the income tax consequences of the proposed abandonment, the
court then discussed whether the debtor was a proper party to
whom the trustee could abandon the property. It held that, be-
cause the debt6r had the right to possess the property at the time
he filed for chapter 11 bankruptcy protection, he qualified as a
party entitled to receive the abandoned property.8
The court finally addressed the primary issue in the case: if
the trustee were permitted to abandon the property to the debtor
as burdensome to the estate, who would be liable for paying the
income taxes on the gain inherent in the property at the time of
73. Id. at 267 (citing Priv. Ltr. Rul. 90-17-075 (Jan. 31, 1990)). The court
noted that, while the private letter ruling did not address the tax issue in the
context of a pending foreclosure proceeding, nevertheless the ruling "certainly
indicates the Service's general inclination to consider abandonment a non-
taxable event." Id.
74. See id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 268. The court noted, however, that the bank holding the mort-
gages on the property was also a proper recipient of the abandoned property be-
cause it also had possessory rights to the property by virtue of having been
granted relief from the automatic stay to foreclose on the property. Id. at 269.
The court stated that, under Massachusetts law, a party entitled to foreclosure
could obtain possession of the property upon the debtor's default on the loan. Id.
Therefore, the court concluded that the bank's possessory rights to the property
were, in fact, superior to the debtor's rights at the time the trustee sought to
abandon the property. Id.
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the abandonment, the estate or the debtor?"9 The court offered
four principal justifications in support of its determination that
the estate was liable for the tax liability.
First, the court held that the proposed abandonment would
be a taxable event because it would constitute a sale or exchange
under the Tax Code.8° The court explained that, when a sale or
exchange occurs, the taxpayer, here the estate, must recognize
gain equal to the excess of the amount realized on the disposition
less the adjusted basis of the property transferred." The court
recognized that a foreclosure of property by a creditor, even
though involuntary to the debtor, was nevertheless a sale or ex-
change for tax purposes.8 2 Arguing that the trustee's proposed
abandonment of the property just prior to foreclosure was the
functional equivalent of a foreclosure for tax purposes, the court
held that the abandonment was indeed a taxable event to the es-
tate ."
The second justification proffered by the court in support of
its holding was based on the judicial doctrine of form over sub-
stance,84 first espoused in the landmark Supreme Court case enti-
tled Commissioner v. Court Holding Co.85 In Court Holding, the
taxpayer was a corporation that had negotiated a sale of its sole
asset, an apartment building, with a purchaser and had obtained
79. See id.
80. Id. at 269-70 (citing I.R.C. § 1001(a) (1988)).
81. Id. at 269.
82. Id. (citing Helvering v. Hammel, 311 U.S. 504, 510 (1941)). The court
noted that a foreclosure constituted a sale or exchange even if a nonrecourse li-
ability was being foreclosed upon. Id. at 269-70 (citing Helvering v. Neb. Bridge
Supply & Lumber Co., 312 U.S. 666 (1941)).
83. Id. at 270-71 (citing Yarbro v. Comm'r, 737 F.2d 479 (5th Cir. 1984)).
The estate's amount realized would depend upon whether the liability that the
bank was attempting to foreclose upon was recourse or nonrecourse in nature.
Id. at 270. If the liability was nonrecourse, then the estate's amount realized
would be the fair market value of the indebtedness. Id. Similarly, if the liability
was recourse, then the amount realized on the transaction would still be the face
amount of the indebtedness, but only if the fair market value of the property be-
ing foreclosed upon was greater than the amount of the indebtedness. See id. If,
however, the liability exceeded the fair market value of the property at foreclo-
sure, then the estate's amount realized would only be the fair market value of
the property surrendered. See id. The difference between the fair market value
of the property and the face amount of the indebtedness would constitute dis-
charge of indebtedness income to the estate. See id. For a more complete discus-
sion of the concept of discharge of indebtedness income, see infra notes 243-58
and accompanying text.
84. A.J. Lane, 133 B.R. at 271.
85. 324 U.S. 331 (1945).
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a deposit for the purchase.86 Because the corporation was advised
that the sale would result in the imposition of a large tax liabil-
ity, it transferred the apartment building to its shareholders and
they consummated the sale.87 The Supreme Court held that the
sale was taxable to the corporation and not to the shareholders.88
The bankruptcy court in A.J. Lane held that the trustee's
proposed abandonment was in essence the same transaction as
that attempted in Court Holding: the trustee was attempting to
transfer property subject to a pending foreclosure sale to the
debtor solely to have the debtor, rather than the estate, taxed on
the ultimate sale.89 As the court quoted from Court Holding:
A sale by one person cannot be transformed for tax purposes into a
sale by another by using the latter as a conduit through which to pass
title. To permit the true nature of a transaction to be disguised by
mere formalisms, which exist solely to alter tax liabilities, would seri-
ously impair the effective administration of the tax policies of Con-
9O
gress.
The court based its third justification for holding that the
bankruptcy trustee's proposed abandonment of the apartment
complex was a taxable event on traditional notions of statutory
interpretation. 91 It first noted that, pursuant to section 1398(f)(2)
of the Tax Code, a transfer of property from the estate to the
debtor '"fin the case of a termination of the estate'" should not be
considered a transfer for tax purposes.92 Using a plain-meaning
approach to statutory interpretation, the court held that an
abandonment of property to the debtor during the administration
of the estate did not fall within this statutory exception because it
did not occur when the estate terminated upon the conclusion of
the bankruptcy proceeding.93 In addition, the court relied on the
symmetry between section 1398(f)(2) and section 1398(i) of the
Tax Code to conclude that this interpretation was correct.94 Un-
der section 1398(i), the debtor succeeds to the tax attributes of
the estate "[in the case of a termination of [the] estate."95 In this
instance, it is clear from the structure of the statute that the
86. Id. at 332.
87. Id. at 333.
88. Id. at 334.
89. A.J. Lane, 133 B.R. at 271-72.
90. Id. at 271 (quoting Court Holding, 324 U.S. at 334).
91. See id. at 272.
92. See id. at 272 (quoting I.R.C. § 1398(f)(2) (1988) (emphasis added)).
93. See id.
94. Id.
95. I.R.C. § 1398(i) (2000).
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phrase "[i]n the case of a termination of [the] estate" refers to the
close of the bankruptcy proceeding. To hold that the same phrase
in the same section of the statute means something different
would do an injustice to the careful construction of the statute:
At the beginning of the case . .. the estate acquires the debtor's prop-
erty tax-free along with the debtor's tax attributes. At the end of the
case, or more accurately at the "termination of the estate," the same
is accomplished in reverse. That has not yet occurred here....
... The Trustee's proposed abandonment would destroy this symme-
try.96
Accordingly, the court held that the abandonment did not fall
within the purview of section 1398(f)(2), and therefore was a tax-
able transfer.97
Finally, the court based its holding on the basic bankruptcy
policy of promoting the debtor's fresh start.9" Noting that the
fresh start policy was controlling in the absence of any other
overriding bankruptcy policies, the court concluded that "[tiaxing
the Debtor on the foreclosure following this proposed abandon-
ment creates a clear burden on the Debtor's fresh start, and there
is no countervailing policy which overrides this consideration."99
Only one other court has followed the A.J. Lane court's hold-
ing that the trustee's abandonment of property to the debtor is a
taxable event. In In re Rubin,' the debtor was a general partner
of a real estate limited partnership, Manatee Associates Limited
Partnership. T1 ' The partnership was in default on a $12 million
real estate loan.02 The debtor, Richard Rubin, filed for chapter 11
bankruptcy protection because of the liability that he was facing
as a general partner of Manatee. 03 One of the assets that became
part of Rubin's bankruptcy estate upon filing was his partnership
interest.104 While in bankruptcy, Rubin negotiated a settlement of
the loan with the lender on behalf of Manatee.'05 The settlement
96. A.J. Lane, 133 B.R. at 272. The court noted that it would be unfair to
the debtor if he were taxed on the built-in gain inherent in the apartment com-
plex at the time of the foreclosure because he would not have any tax attributes,
such as net operating losses, available against which to offset this gain, as these
tax attributes would still be property of the bankruptcy estate. Id.
97. Id. at 273-74.
98. Id. at 274.
99. Id.
100. 154 B.R. 897 (Bankr. D. Md. 1992) (mem.).
101. Id. at 898.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. See id.
105. Id.
[Vol 88:723
ABANDONMENTS IN BANKRUPTCY
was to result in a tax liability of $300,000 to the partnership,
which would have flowed through to the partners and been re-
ported on their individual income tax returns.106 Because Rubin
was in bankruptcy, however, and the partnership interest was
property of his bankruptcy estate, it would have been the estate,
and not Rubin personally, that would have been liable for any tax
liability resulting from the settlement.
0 7
The bankruptcy trustee did not seek abandonment of the
partnership interest as burdensome to the estate."0 8 Therefore,
the unsecured creditors' committee, using the authority given to
them under the Bankruptcy Code,09 sought a court order compel-
ling the trustee to abandon the partnership interest before the
settlement took place so that the debtor, and not his estate,
would be responsible for the tax liability resulting from the
transaction. 0
The court, relying on the analysis set forth in A.J. Lane, held
that the proposed abandonment of the partnership interest to the
debtor would constitute a taxable event for the estate."' The
court found that the plain meaning of section 1398(f)(2) of the
Tax Code clearly established that only an abandonment occurring
at the termination of the bankruptcy estate could qualify as a
nontaxable event."' It also held that any other holding would im-
pede the debtor's fresh start: "the overriding bankruptcy policy of
a fresh start militates against the fundamental unfairness of im-
posing this burden upon [the] debtor after his emergence from Ti-
tle 11."' 3
106. Id.
107. See id.
108. See id. at 902.
109. See 11 U.S.C. § 554(b) (2000); see also supra note 34 and accompanying
text.
110. Rubin, 154 B.R. at 898-99.
111. Id. at 899.
112. Id. at 900-01.
113. Id. at 899. Several other cases have also held that the trustee could not
avoid potential tax liability by abandoning property to the debtor. The facts of
those cases differ from the cases discussed in this Article, however, because the
trustee in each case sought abandonment after the assets in question were al-
ready sold. For example, in Erickson v. United States (In re Bentley), 916 F.2d
431 (8th Cir. 1990), the trustee sold the debtor's corn crop, which constituted
property of the estate, for a sizeable gain. After the sale, the trustee discovered
that the crop was subject to valid hens in excess of its value. Id. at 432. Accord-
ingly, the trustee abandoned the proceeds of the corn crop sale and sought a de-
termination from the court that the estate was not liable for the gain on the sale
of the crop. Id. The Eighth Circuit upheld the district court's holding that the
sale of the corn crop was a taxable event, and that the bankruptcy estate was
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B. ABANDONMENTS NOT CONSIDERED TRANSFERS
FOR TAx PURPOSES
Although the A.J. Lane and Rubin cases were both well writ-
ten and carefully reasoned, the majority of courts facing this is-
sue have adopted the opposing view that the trustee's abandon-
ment of property to the debtor during the bankruptcy proceeding
is not a taxable event."4 The leading case reaching this conclu-
sion is Samore v. Olson (In re Olson)."' In Olson, the debtors,
husband and wife, owned two tracts of land that were subject to a
-- 116
mortgage. The lender, First Interstate Bank, began foreclosure
proceedings when the debtors defaulted on the mortgage.17 After
the foreclosure process had begun, the debtors filed a chapter 7
bankruptcy petition, and the tracts of land became property ofS 118
the debtors' bankruptcy estate. The trustee abandoned the
properties as burdensome to the estate, and First Interstate
Bank then sold the tracts at a properly authorized foreclosure
sale."9 The trustee then sought a determination from the court
that the abandonment was not a sale or exchange under the Tax
Code, and therefore did not result in taxable gain to the bank-
ruptcy estate.1
20
indeed responsible for the tax liability imposed on the inherent gain at the time
of the sale. Id. at 433. The court held that even if the abandonment was not a
taxable event for the bankruptcy estate, the sale of the property had already oc-
curred prior to the abandonment, and it was too late to shift the tax conse-
quences to the debtor at that time. Id.; see also In re Perlman, 188 B.R. 704, 706
(Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1995) ("The Trustee's sale of estate property was a taxable
event that cannot be undone by an attempted retroactive abandonment of the
assets or by an abandonment of the sale proceeds.").
114. See, e.g., Samore v. Olson (In re Olson), 930 F.2d 6, 8 (8th Cir. 1991) (per
curiam); In re Popp, 166 B.R. 697, 699 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1993) (mem.); Terjen v.
Santoro (In re Terjen), 154 B.R. 456, 458 (E.D. Va. 1993), affd, 30 F.3d 131 (4th
Cir. 1994) (unpublished table decision); In re Burpo, 148 B.R. 918, 920 (Bankr.
W.D. Mo. 1993).
115. 930 F.2d 6(8th Cir. 1991) (per curiam).
116. Id. at 7.
117. Id.
118. See id.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 7-8. The debtors did not object to the trustee's abandonment of
the land to them during the bankruptcy proceeding. Id. The tax issue arose be-
cause, following the foreclosure sale, the debtors hired accountants to prepare
and file income tax returns on behalf of the estate without the trustee's author-
ity. Id. The debtors instructed the accountants to report the gain inherent in the
properties on the estate's tax return because the trustee's abandonment was a
taxable event. Id. The trustee then initiated this adversary proceeding against
the debtors, seeking a determination from the court that the abandonment was
not a sale or exchange and, accordingly, the estate was not liable for the tax. See
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In a very brief opinion, the Eighth Circuit affirmed the de-
terminations of both the bankruptcy and district courts that the
trustee's abandonment of estate property to the debtors was not a
taxable transfer.121 Citing section 1398(f)(2) of the Tax Code for
the proposition that a transfer of property from the bankruptcy
estate to the debtor at the conclusion of the case was not a tax-
able event, the court reasoned that it could see "no reason why
abandonment during the administration of the case should have
a different effect.1 22 The court recognized that the tracts of land
ceased to be property of the estate upon abandonment and that
title to the land thereby reverted back to the debtors. 123 Thus, be-
cause the abandonment was not a taxable event and the land was
no longer property of the bankruptcy estate at the time of the
foreclosure sale, the debtors, and not the estate, were responsible
for the income tax liability on any gain inherent in the land at the
time of the sale.
12 4
Although Olson is the only appellate decision concluding that
abandonment is not a taxable event,' 21 several district and bank-
ruptcy court decisions have relied on Olson to reach the same
conclusion. 126 For example, in Terjen v. Santoro (In re Terjen),"
the trustee abandoned real property back to the debtor as of in-
consequential value to the estate because it was encumbered by
liabilities in excess of its fair market value.' 28 The debtor objected
to the proposed abandonment, arguing in part that the proposed
abandonment would not shift the taxable gain from the estate to
the debtor because the abandonment itself was a taxable event.
129
The district court found the trustee's abandonment of the
property to be appropriate, and held that the abandonment did
id.
121. Id. at 8.
122. Id. (citing I.R.C. § 1398(f)(2) (1986)).
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. There is one other appellate decision permitting the trustee to abandon
property as burdensome to the estate based on the adverse tax consequences
that would result if the estate continued to hold the property at the time of fore-
closure. Johnston v. Webster (In re Johnston), 49 F.3d 538, 541 (9th Cir. 1995).
The Ninth Circuit, however, expressly declined to opine on the tax consequences
of the proposed abandonment to the debtors or the estate. See id.
126. See cases cited supra note 114.
127. 154 B.R. 456 (E.D. Va. 1993), afld, 30 F.3d 131 (4th Cir. 1994) (unpub-
lished table decision).
128. See id. at 457.
129. Id. at 457-58.
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not constitute a taxable event."' Refusing to read section
1398(f)(2) of the Tax Code narrowly to apply only to transfers by
the estate to the debtor at the termination of the bankruptcy
case, the court instead adopted "the view of other courts which
have included abandonments by the trustee during the pendency
of bankruptcy within section 1398(f)(2)."' 31
Similarly, a Missouri bankruptcy court followed Olson as
precedential authority on the abandonment issue in In re
Burpo,3' a case with facts nearly identical to those in Olson and
Terjen. Although the court was sympathetic to the debtors' argu-
ment that they would be liable for recognizing the gain inherent
in the properties if the trustee were allowed to abandon them be-
fore foreclosure, it nevertheless felt compelled to follow the
Eighth Circuit's decision that abandonment was not a taxable
event for the bankruptcy estate.13  Addressing the debtors' argu-
ment that its holding would deny them their fresh start after
bankruptcy, the court stated:
This Court recognizes that the thrust of the Bankruptcy Reform
Act of 1978 is to afford honest debtors a fresh start. Unfortunately,
that is not always possible. In this case, the Court regrets that debt-
ors fall within that unfortunate group that Congress has declared
cannot be absolved of all economic sins and truly be born again."M
The Internal Revenue Service has consistently followed the
holding in Olson when responding to ruling requests from tax-
payers. In Private Letter Ruling 96-11-028,13 for example, the
debtors filed for chapter 11 bankruptcy protection on August 2,
1991. Certain properties owned by the debtors, including several
limited partnership interests, were abandoned by the trustee to
the debtor as burdensome to the bankruptcy estate. The Ser
vice ruled that the abandonments would not be treated as taxable
dispositions by the bankruptcy estate, citing Olson as authority
for its position.37
130. Id. at 458.
131. Id. (citing In re Olson, 930 F.2d 6, 8 (8th Cir. 1991) (per curiam); In re
McGowan, 95 B.R. 104, 107 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1988) (mem.)).
132. 148 B.R. 918, 920 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1993).
133. Id. The court did acknowledge that it had read the AJ. Lane decision
"with interest and respect." Id.
134. Id.
135. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 96-11-028 (Dec. 14, 1995).
136. Id.
137. Id.; see also Priv. Ltr. Rul. 92-45-023 (Aug. 7, 1992) ("IThe abandon-
ment of property from a bankruptcy estate to a debtor is not a taxable disposi-
tion giving rise to gain or loss."); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 90-17-075 (Jan. 31, 1990)
(concluding that the phrase "termination of the estate" in I.R.C. § 1398(f)(2) was
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From a strict statutory construction perspective, there can be
little doubt that A.J. Lane and its progeny represent the correct
interpretation of section 1398(f) of the Tax Code. Recall that the
Tax Code states that a transfer of property from one taxpayer to
another is a taxable event unless a provision of the Code specifi-
cally provides otherwise. 138 Section 1398(f) provides that a trans-
fer of property from the estate to the debtor is not a taxable
transfer so long as it occurs upon the "termination of the es-
tate."139 The clear implication of section 1398(f) is that a transfer
of property from the estate to the debtor before the termination of
the bankruptcy estate is a taxable event. Does the trustee's
abandonment of property to the debtor during the pendency of a
bankruptcy proceeding occur at the termination of the estate?
It is a well-settled matter of case law that a dictionary can
often be a useful tool in attempting to discern the plain meaning
of a statute.140 According to a dictionary, "termination" means an
"end in time or existence" or a "conclusion."141 It is clear from even
a cursory reading of section 1398(f) that the term "termination"
refers to the bankruptcy estate.42 It is equally clear that an
abandonment of property occurs while the estate is still in exis-
tence.13 Thus, under a plain reading of the statute, an abandon-
ment does not occur at the "conclusion" of the estate, or at the
end of its "existence."
Accordingly, A.J. Lane and its progeny were correct in hold-
ing that a trustee's abandonment of property to the debtor during
a bankruptcy proceeding was a taxable event because the aban-
donment did not occur upon the "termination of the estate."44 01-
broad enough to encompass "the termination of the estate's interest in property
by virtue of abandonment").
138. See I.R.C. § 1001(a) (2000) (stating that a "sale or other disposition" of
property results in a realized gain or loss equal to the amount realized on the
disposition less the adjusted basis of the property transferred).
139. See id. § 1398(f)(2).
140. See, e.g., Nix v. Hedden, 149 U.S. 304, 307 (1893) (using a dictionary to
discern whether tomatoes are "fruit" or "vegetables" under the Tariff Act of
1883); see also WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., ET AL., LEGISLATION AND STATUTORY
INTERPRETATION 251-52 (2000) (stating that since Nix v. Hedden the Court has
"increasingly relied on dictionaries in discerning ordinary meaning").
141. MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 1289 (11th ed. 2003).
142. I.R.C. § 1398(f)(2) ("In the case of a termination of the estate....").
143. See, e.g., Samore v. Olson (In re Olson), 930 F.2d 6, 7 (8th Cir. 1991) (per
curiam); In re A.J. Lane & Co., 133 B.R. 264, 272 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1991).
144. See supra notes 92-97 and accompanying text. A.J. Lane's interpreta-
tion of the statutory language of section 1398(f) can also be supported under
well-settled canons of statutory construction. For example, a widely accepted
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son's holding that the phrase "termination of the estate" was
broad enough to encompass a termination of the estate's interest
in property upon its abandonment is simply misplaced.4 5 While
A.J. Lane is correct as a matter of strict statutory construction,
however, it can be challenged from a policy perspective.
III. COMPETING TAX AND BANKRUPTCY POLICIES
Legal scholarship in the field of debtor and creditor relations
tends to focus exclusively on the bankruptcy aspects of a vexing
legal issue; very few scholars have attempted to harmonize the
often conflicting bankruptcy and tax policies underlying these is-146
sues. Similarly, the congressional committees devoted to ad-
dressing tax issues, the House Ways and Means Committee and
the Senate Finance Committee, have often been criticized for
passing bankruptcy tax measures as part of an overall tax reform
bill without consulting or coordinating with their committee
counterparts devoted to bankruptcy issues, the House and Senate
Judiciary Committees. 147 Thus, neither academic literature nor
notion of statutory interpretation, the whole act rule, suggests that a statute
should be interpreted as a whole, so that the interpretation of one provision of
the statute does not render it inconsistent with another provision. See, e.g.,
United Sav. Ass'n of Tex. v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs., 484 U.S. 365,
371 (1988); see also ESKRIDGE, JR., ET AL., supra note 140, at 263-66. As the
court in A.J. Lane suggests, to interpret section 1398(f) to include abandon-
ments would be inconsistent with section 1398(i), which states that the debtor
succeeds to all of the estate's unused tax attributes upon the "termination of
the estate." See A.J. Lane, 133 B.R. at 272-73. As one leading treatise has
suggested, section 1398(i) and section 1398(f) complement one another:
Taken together, these sections provide that, at the termination of the
estate, all assets and tax attributes left in the estate are returned to
the debtor. This gives the debtor an opportunity to use any remaining
tax attributes to offset gain that might be inherent in the property. To
provide for the tax-free disposition of property from the estate to the
debtor without the concurrent transfer of tax attributes would distort
the statutory framework set out in section 1398.
JAMES F. QUEENAN ET AL., CHAPTER 11 THEORY AND PRACTICE: A GUIDE TO
REORGANIZATION § 25:71, at 25:85 (1994).
145. See supra notes 122-24 and accompanying text.
146. This paragraph borrowed heavily from Michelle Arnopol Cecil, Rein-
vigorating Chapter 11: The Case for Reinstating the Stock-for-Debt Exception in
Bankruptcy, 2000 WIS. L. REv. 1001, 1042.
147. See, e.g., Letter from Representative Jack Brooks, Chairman, House Ju-
diciary Committee, to Representative Dan Rostenkowski, Chairman, House
Committee on Ways and Means 2 (July 15, 1993) (on file with author) ("I believe
it is desirable for the overall economic policy that changes in the tax law not
come at the expense of longstanding bankruptcy policy and not threaten this na-
tion's job base."); see also Steven J. Csontos et al., Congress's Role in Tax Policy:
A Roundtable Discussion, 3 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 257, 292-93 (1995);
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recent legislation has explored the intersection of these two vast
bodies of law. Resolving the issue of how to treat bankruptcy
abandonments for tax purposes is one small step toward harmo-
nizing bankruptcy and tax policy. Yet before a resolution can be
crafted, it is necessary to ascertain the bankruptcy and tax poli-
cies underlying the abandonments issue and how these policies
are in conflict.
A. TAX POLICIES RELATING TO ABANDONMENTS14 s
A fundamental tenet of tax law is that the imposition of a tax
should correspond with the taxpayer's ability to pay the resulting
liability. 49 Thus, one of the first and most elementary tax con-
cepts is that gains are taxed only when they are "realized."5 ° A
realization event occurs when a taxpayer sells, exchanges, or oth-
Robert A. Jacobs, The Bankruptcy Court's Emergence as Tax Dispute Arbiter of
Choice, 45 TAX LAW. 971, 1029 (1992).
148. The first three paragraphs of this subsection have been adapted from
Michelle Arnopol Cecil, Toward Adding Further Complexity to the Internal
Revenue Code: A New Paradigm for the Deductibility of Capital Losses, 1999 U.
ILL. L. REV. 1083, 1095-96.
149. See, e.g., PHILIP D. OLIVER & FRED W. PEEL, JR., TAX POLICY 50 (1996);
U.S. DEP~T OF THE TREASURY, BLUEPRINTS FOR BASIC TAX REFORM 81 (1977);
see also Joshua D. Rosenberg, Tax Avoidance and Income Measurement, 87
MICH. L. REV. 365, 366 (1988) (stating that in the U.S. tax system, a taxpayer's
taxable income in part reflects the extent to which a tax liability might impose
an undue hardship on the taxpayer); Sam K. Kaywood, Jr., Comment, The Defi-
cit Reduction Act of 1984: Reform for Deferred Payment Accounting, 35 EMORY
L.J. 507, 513 (1986) (stating that the policy behind the cash receipts and dis-
bursements method is that tax liability should be linked to the taxpayer's ability
to pay).
150. The realization requirement first became a part of the Tax Code in 1924
and was codified as section 202(a) of the Revenue Act of 1924. Revenue Act of
1924, ch. 234, 43 Stat. 253, 255 (1924). Although the requirement has been relo-
cated to numerous other Code sections throughout the years, it has consistently
remained a part of the structure of the Tax Code. Today, the realization re-
quirement is contained in I.R.C. § 1001(a)-(b).
As one noted tax scholar stated, "[t]he principle of realization has histori-
cally been central to the jurisprudence of the federal income tax." Edward A.
Zelinsky, For Realization: Income Taxation, Sectorial Accretionism, and the
Virtue of Attainable Virtues, 19 CARDOzO L. REV. 861, 861 (1997). Although a
discussion of how the realization concept has evolved over time is beyond the
scope of this Article, it is discussed in some detail in Daniel N. Shaviro, An Ef-
ficiency Analysis of Realization and Recognition Rules Under the Federal In-
come Tax, 48 TAX L. REV. 1, 10-14 (1992). There are, however, scholars who
have attacked the realization concept as improper as a matter of tax policy.
See, e.g., Stephen B. Land, Defeating Deferral: A Proposal for Retrospective
Taxation, 52 TAX L. REV. 45, 48-59 (1996); see also infra note 153 and accom-
panying text.
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erwise disposes of an asset.' Because taxpayers can carefully
time when they will be taxed on their gains, if at all,'52 tax schol-
ars have attacked the realization concept for years as antithetical
to an ideal income tax base.
Over half a century ago, two noted economists independently
attempted to define what would constitute an ideal and compre-
hensive income tax base. These economists, Robert Haig and
Henry Simons, concluded that income should be defined as the
sum of the taxpayer's consumption plus any changes in her net
worth over the relevant accounting period.' Under the Haig-
Simons definition of income, tax deferral would be impermissible;
therefore, any appreciation in the fair market value of an asset
would be taxed each year as it accrues, rather than waiting until
the asset is sold and the gain is realized."5 For example, assume
that a taxpayer purchased an apartment building for $800,000 in
1999. If that building appreciated in value to $880,000 in 2000,
under the Haig-Simons system the taxpayer would be taxed on
$80,000 in 2000, the amount representing the appreciation that
accrued during that year. Taxing this appreciation annually is
justified because the taxpayer has already enjoyed the benefits of
the property's appreciation in value, including its use and myriad
economic benefits, such as the ability to pledge the property as
collateral for a loan and a potential increase in depreciation de-
151. See I.R.C. § 1001 (2000) (providing rules for determining calculation of
gain or loss on the sale or disposition of property).
152. When property is acquired by bequest, devise, or inheritance, the basis
of the property in the hands of the recipient will generally be its fair market
value on the date of the decedent's death, unless an alternative valuation date is
chosen. See I.R.C. § 1014 (2000). Thus, all of the gain inherent in the property at
the time of the decedent's death will escape taxation forever. For a more com-
prehensive discussion of this stepped-up basis at death, and its repeal beginning
in 2011, see infra notes 178-80 and accompanying text.
153. See, e.g., DAVID F. BRADFORD & U.S. TREASURY TAX POLICY STAFF,
BLUEPRINTS FOR BASIC TAX REFORM 5 (2d ed., rev. 1984); Land, supra note 150,
at 48; Shaviro, supra note 150, at 10-14.
154. See HENRY C. SIMONS, PERSONAL INCOME TAXATION: THE DEFINITION
OF INCOME AS A PROBLEM OF FISCAL POLICY 50 (1938); Robert Murray Haig, The
Concept of Income-Economic and Legal Aspects, in THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX
1, 7 (Robert Murray Haig ed., 1921), reprinted in 9 READINGS IN THE ECONOMICS
OF TAXATION 54 (Richard A- Musgrave & Carl S. Shoup eds., 1959). More spe-
cifically, Simons defined income as "the algebraic sum of (1) the market value of
rights exercised in consumption and (2) the change in the value of the store of
property rights between the beginning and end of the period in question."
SIMONS, supra, at 50.
155. See Land, supra note 150, at 48.
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ductions associated with the property. 56 Under Haig-Simons, if
the taxpayer then filed for chapter 7 bankruptcy protection in
January 2001, there would be no gain inherent in the property at
the time of filing because the taxpayer would have already in-
cluded the appreciation in income annually as it accrued. Accord-
ingly, the issue of how to tax abandonments in bankruptcy would
not arise because the trustee would never be forced to abandon
otherwise valuable property merely because of the adverse tax
consequences that might inure to the bankruptcy estate.
Nevertheless, the realization requirement has been a main-
stay of the Tax Code almost since the Code's inception in 1913.' 57
Although the realization concept can be justified on several policy
grounds, each centers on the fundamental concept of administra-
tive feasibility. 5 1 It is simply impracticable to tax gains annually
as they accrue because of the valuation and liquidity problems
associated with such a tax. 159 Even Henry Simons, a principal ar-
chitect of the Haig-Simons definition of an ideal income tax base,
noted that "[t]he realization criterion is not only indispensable to
a feasible income-tax system but relatively unobjectionable in
principle where it results only in postponement of assessment."6 °
Moreover, such an accrual system would require that the gov-
ernment compensate a taxpayer for losses as they accrue as well,
an approach that would not only be impossible to administer but
would lead to ludicrous results.16' Thus, it is realization that cre-
156. See, e.g., 1 NAT L BANKR. REVIEW CoMM'N, BANKRuPrcy: THE NEXT
TWENTY YEARS-NATIONAL BANKRUPTCY REVIEW COMMISSION FINAL REPORT
971 (1997).
157. For a discussion of the history of the realization concept, see supra note
150.
158. It is important to understand that not all tax scholars accept adminis-
trative feasibility as enough of a justification to abandon Haig-Simons in favor of
realization. See, e.g., Mary Louise Fellows, A Comprehensive Attack on Tax De-
ferral, 88 MICH. L. REV. 722, 724-28 (1990); see also Land, supra note 150, at
59-73 (discussing administrative methods used to limit the realization require-
ment).
159. See David J. Shakow, Taxation Without Realization: A Proposal for Ac-
crual Taxation, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 1111, 1113-14 (1986). For a more compre-
hensive discussion of the problems of liquidity and valuation, see Cecil, supra
note 148, at 1096-98.
160. SIMONS, supra note 154, at 162.
161. Under a true accretion-type tax system, a decrease in income, which
includes a reduction in a taxpayer's net worth over his annual accounting pe-
riod, would require the government to return the unfortunate taxpayer's losses
in the form of a tax refund. See MARTIN DAVID, ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES TO
CAPITAL GAINs TAXATION 166 (1968); see also Fellows, supra note 158, at 803-
04 (discussing tax treatment of net losses). From a practical perspective, such
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ates the adverse tax consequences associated with bankruptcy
abandonments. Yet retaining the realization requirement as a
fundamental attribute of the federal income tax system continues
to be an administrative necessity.
Under the current tax system, realized gains must be recog-
nized, or included in the taxpayer's gross income, in the year in
which the realization event occurs. 162 Accordingly, as a matter of
fundamental tax policy, the built-in gain inherent in property
must be taxed upon a sale or other disposition of the property,
even if that sale or disposition occurs during a bankruptcy pro-
ceeding. To hold otherwise would allow the bankruptcy system to
be used merely as a mechanism to avoid an otherwise valid tax
liability. But who should bear the burden of that tax in the bank-
ruptcy context, the debtor or the bankruptcy estate? Traditional
notions of tax policy dictate that, because it was the debtor who
enjoyed the appreciation that accrued in an asset before the filing
of the bankruptcy petition, it should be the debtor who bears the
burden of the tax on that pre-petition appreciation in bankruptcy,
irrespective of whether the trustee sells or exchanges the prop-
erty during the bankruptcy proceeding or instead abandons it to
the debtor, where it is sold or exchanged while property of the
debtor.163
a refund program would strain government revenues, perhaps to the breaking
point. See Fellows, supra note 158, at 804 (suggesting that a refund rule would
be "politically unacceptable").
162. See I.R.C. § 1001 (2000). A realized gain must be recognized unless the
taxpayer's sale or disposition qualifies for one of the Tax Code's nonrecognition
provisions. See id. § 1001(c). If a nonrecognition provision applies to a transac-
tion, the realized gain is not included in the taxpayer's income in the year of the
disposition; however, the gain is preserved and is taxed at a later time. Thus,
nonrecognition provisions merely defer the inclusion of gain in income; they do
not operate to exclude the gain from taxation forever. See, e.g., id. § 351 (defer-
ring recognition of gain on the formation of a corporation); id. § 453 (permitting
the recognition of gain over time for an installment sale); id. § 1031 (deferring
recognition of gain in a like-kind exchange). There is one major exception to the
concept that realized gains must be recognized, either currently or in the future.
A taxpayer may exclude up to $250,000 from income ($500,000 for married tax-
payers filing joint tax returns) on the sale or exchange of a principal residence if
certain requirements are met. See id. § 121.
163. See, e.g., 1 NAT'L BANKR. REVIEW COMM'N, supra note 156, at 970-71.
The proposal outlined in Part V of this Article discusses this concept in greater
detail. It also answers the question of who should bear the burden of tax on the
appreciation that accrues after the filing of the bankruptcy petition. See infra
notes 279-80 and accompanying text.
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B. CONFLICTING BANKRUPTCY POLICIES
Although as a matter of pure tax policy the built-in gain in-
herent in property should not escape taxation entirely merely be-
cause the taxpayer has filed for bankruptcy protection, what of
bankruptcy policy?' The twin policies underlying the bank-
ruptcy system are to ensure fair and equitable distribution to all
165creditors, in part by maximizing the bankruptcy estate for the
benefit of those creditors, 166 and to preserve the debtor's fresh
start after bankruptcy. 67 If an abandonment by the trustee is
treated as a taxable event to the bankruptcy estate, the income
taxes owed on the resulting gain will deplete the estate's assets,
thereby defeating the bankruptcy policy of maximizing the distri-
bution to unsecured creditors. Conversely, if the abandonment is
not treated as a taxable event to the estate, the debtor, rather
164. Some bankruptcy scholars argue that recent bankruptcy reform legisla-
tion is no longer grounded in sound bankruptcy policy; rather, it is the product of
intense pressure by lobbyists and largely supports only special interest groups.
See William T. Bodoh & Lawrence P. Dempsey, Bankruptcy Reform: An Orderly
Development of Public Policy?, 49 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 191, 193-94 (2001).
165. See Burlingham v. Crouse, 228 U.S. 459, 473 (1913); see also IRS v. Lu-
ongo (In re Luongo), 259 F.3d 323, 330 (5th Cir. 2001) ("The bankruptcy court's
responsibility in administering the estate is ... to achieve a fair and equitable
distribution of assets to the creditors.. . ."); BENJAMIN WEINTRAUB & ALAN N.
RESNICK, BANKRUPTCY LAW MANUAL 1.02[1] [d] (3d ed. 1992) (recognizing that
one purpose of bankruptcy is "the conversion of the debtor's assets into cash for
equal distribution among creditors").
To be sure, not all creditors are treated identically in bankruptcy. Secured
creditors are treated more favorably than unsecured creditors, and certain un-
secured creditors' claims are given priority over other unsecured claims. See
11 U.S.C. §§ 502, 506, 507 (2000); see also Elizabeth Warren, Bankruptcy Pol-
icy, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 775, 785-86 (1987) ("[A] significant part of [the Bank-
ruptcy Code's] distributional scheme is oriented toward establishing priorities
among creditors.").
166. See, e.g., Bodoh & Dempsey, supra note 164, at 194.
167. See H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 125 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5963, 6086 (noting that the fresh start allows debtors "to get out from under the
debilitating effects of too much debt" and that "[tihe two most important aspects
of the fresh start available under the Bankruptcy laws are the provision of ade-
quate property for a return to normal life, and the discharge, with the release
from creditor collection attempts"); see also 147 CONG. REc. H133 (daily ed. Jan.
31, 2001) (statement of Rep. Gekas) ("[Tihe real purpose of bankruptcy reform or
any bankruptcy legislation [is] to allow an American citizen the right to gain a
fresh start after finding himself incapable of meeting his obligations."); Miles,
supra note 20, at 799-800 ("The [bankruptcy] system must be fair. Critical to
the achievement of fairness of course is balance: that is, balance between the
debtor's obtaining a 'fresh start'; the need to pay the debtor's obligations to credi-
tors; and the need for balance between competing creditors." (footnotes omit-
ted)).
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than the bankruptcy estate, will be liable for paying taxes on the
asset's built-in gain. Such a tax liability would diminish the
debtor's ability to enjoy a fresh start, frustrating the second policy
justification for the bankruptcy system. Is there a tax resolution
to this vexing issue that can harmonize these competing bank-
ruptcy policies?
IV. EXISTING PROPOSALS FOR RESOLVING THE
BANKRUPTCY ABANDONMENT ISSUE
This is not the first scholarly article or study to recognize the
complex bankruptcy and tax policies that are implicated when a
bankruptcy trustee abandons property to a debtor during the
administration of a bankruptcy estate. Four other significant
works have proposed solutions to the problem of how to tax
abandonments in bankruptcy. Although none of these proposals
offers a complete resolution to the problem, each proposal never-
theless provides valuable insights. Because this Article builds on
the ideas of those who have studied the issue in the past, this sec-
tion will explore each of these proposals in detail.
A. THE COMMERCIAL LAW LEAGUE OF AMERICA PROPOSAL
In March 1996, the Commercial Law League of America con-
ducted an empirical study designed to measure whether bank-
ruptcy abandonments had a significant effect on the distribution
of assets to creditors in chapter 7 bankruptcy proceedings.'68 The
study was predicated on the hypothesis that trustees were aban-
doning assets to debtors rather than selling them for the benefit
of creditors because of the adverse tax impact that the sales of
those assets would have on the bankruptcy estate. 9 The study
examined a four-year period between 1992 and 1995 and was
sent to approximately 600 bankruptcy trustees across the United
States.
170
The results of the Commercial Law League's study were
staggering. It found that 11,933 cases involved assets that the
trustee abandoned to the debtor or simply did not sell because
the capital gains liability resulting from the sales would have
168. See Moses, supra note 23, at 219.
169. See Commercial Law League of Am., supra note 24, at 21.
170. See Moses, supra note 23, at 219. The trustees selected for inclusion in
the study were active chapter 7 bankruptcy trustees who were members of the
National Association of Bankruptcy Trustees. Id.
[Vol 88:723
ABANDONMENTS IN BANKRUPTCY
been overly burdensome to the estate.17' The study concluded that
"[e]xclusive of the potential capital gain taxes and the obligations
owed to the creditors secured by the assets, the net amount which
was not available to the estates for distribution to the unsecured
creditors totaled $78,511,000.,,17' Because only twenty-five per-
cent of the bankruptcy trustees who received the survey re-
sponded to its questionnaire, the Commercial Law League esti-
mated that the actual amount unavailable to unsecured creditors
during the four-year testing period was closer to $340,000,000.'7
These results are significant because they offer the first
glimpse into the magnitude of the abandonment issue. As the
study suggests, because trustees are abandoning property to
debtors or simply allowing it to revert back to the debtors upon
termination of the bankruptcy estate because of the adverse tax
consequences associated with selling the property, unsecured
creditors "are being deprived of a source of funds from which they
could recoup some portion of the billions lost each year to bank-
rupt debtors." 74
The Commercial Law League concluded its study by propos-
ing to the National Bankruptcy Review Commission that chapter
7 bankruptcy trustees receive a "stepped-up basis" in property of
the debtor that becomes part of the estate, thereby eliminating
the estate's tax liability upon the sale of the property in bank-
ruptcy.' 75 "As one of the goals of bankruptcy is to enhance creditor
distributions, eliminating the disincentives that force the aban-
donment would benefit the creditor community and [the] bank-
ruptcy system as a whole.17 6
Although the Commercial Law League's empirical study re-
171. Id. at 220; Commercial Law League of Am., supra note 24, at 21.
172. Commercial Law League of Am., supra note 24, at 21. The study estab-
lished that the amount unavailable to debtors' unsecured creditors averaged
over $1.1 million for each of the 136 trustees that responded to the survey. See
id. It is interesting to note that the trustees responding were very experienced
bankruptcy trustees, with an average length of service of 11.58 years and an av-
erage caseload over the four-year survey period of 2320 cases. Id.
173. Moses, supra note 23, at 220.
174. Commercial Law League of Am., supra note 24, at 21.
175. See id. at 22; Moses, supra note 23, at 219. According to the study, this
stepped-up basis proposal would operate in a manner similar to provisions that
provide heirs a stepped-up basis in the decedent's assets on death. Commercial
Law League of Am., supra note 24, at 21. For a glimpse at the provision offering
heirs a stepped-up basis on the decedent's death, see I.R.C. § 1014 (2000). It is
important to note that this provision will be repealed beginning in 2011. See 26
U.S.C.A. § 1022 (West 2002); see also infra note 180 and accompanying text.
176. Moses, supra note 23, at 219.
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sults provide a significant contribution to any discussion of the
bankruptcy abandonment issue, the study's proposed solution is
unfeasible for both practical and policy reasons. First, from a tax
policy perspective, because the debtor enjoyed the benefits of the
appreciation inherent in his assets before bankruptcy, that ap-
preciation should be subject to taxation when the assets are sold
or otherwise disposed of, whether that sale or disposition occurs
during or after bankruptcy. To offer the trustee a stepped-up ba-
sis in the debtor's assets when they are transferred into the
bankruptcy estate would frustrate the well-established policy of
taxing gains when they are realized.177 While it is true that a de-
cedent's assets receive a stepped-up basis at death, so that the
gains inherent in those assets are never taxed, 17 most tax schol-
ars agree that the provision allowing a stepped-up basis at death
is contrary to tax policy and should be abolished. 9 Moreover,
that provision has, in fact, been repealed for decedents dying af-
ter December 31, 2009.180 Therefore, reliance on the stepped-up
177. For a discussion of the realization concept, see supra notes 150-62 and
accompanying text.
178. When property is acquired by bequest, devise, or inheritance, the basis
of the property in the hands of the recipient will generally be its fair market
value at the date of the decedent's death (unless a statutorily provided alterna-
tive valuation date is chosen), rather than the decedent's original basis in the
property. I.R.C. § 1014(a). Thus, this basis (as adjusted) will be used to deter-
mine the recipient's gain or loss when the property is later sold or exchanged.
I.R.C. §§ 1001, 1011 (2000); see also Hess v. United States, 537 F.2d 457, 462
(Ct. C1. 1976). Accordingly, any unrealized gain attributable to the period during
which the decedent held the property escapes tax permanently. E.g., Shaviro,
supra note 150, at 16.
179. E.g., Noel B. Cunningham & Deborah H. Schenk, The Case for a Capital
Gains Preference, 48 TAX L. REV. 319, 346 (1993); Joseph E. Snoe, Tax Simplifi-
cation and Fairness: Four Proposals for Fundamental Tax Reform, 60 ALB. L.
REV. 61, 82 (1996).
180. See 26 U.S.C.A. § 1022 (West 2002). The provision allowing a stepped-
up basis at death is scheduled to be repealed at the same time that the estate
tax is repealed. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 107-84, at 193 (2001), reprinted in 2001
U.S.C.C.A.N. 46, 118. When the new law takes effect in 2010, the basis of prop-
erty acquired from a decedent through a will or through intestacy will be the
lesser of the decedent's adjusted basis in the property or its fair market value at
the time of his death. 26 U.S.C.A. § 1022(a)(2) (West 2002). Section 1022 also
allows the executor of the decedent's estate to increase the aggregate basis in the
decedent's assets by $1.3 million, so long as the basis for any asset is not in-
creased above its fair market value. See id. § 1022(b)(2)(B), (d)(2). Finally, for
property passing to the decedent's spouse, the executor can increase the aggre-
gate basis of such property by an additional $3 million, subject again to the ca-
veat that the basis for any asset cannot be increased above its fair market value.
Id. § 1022(c)(2)(B), (d)(2). These provisions are currently scheduled to sunset be-
ginning in 2011. See id. § 1022.
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basis at death as support for the Commercial Law League's pro-
posal is unpersuasive.
Not only is the proposal difficult to justify from a policy per-
spective, it is administratively unfeasible as a practical matter as
well. The federal government would lose a large source of revenue
if Congress adopted the Commercial Law League's proposal. 1
2
The proposal disputes this massive revenue loss, arguing that,
under current law, this property reverts back to the debtor and
the gain inherent in the property escapes taxation through a
number of provisions, including the exclusion of gain from the
sale of a principal residence and the like-kind exchange provi-
sions. The Commercial Law League provides no support for this
conclusion, however, and case law suggests otherwise. In virtu-
ally all of the cases outlined above in which the trustee aban-
doned property to the debtor because of the adverse tax conse-
quences that would accrue to the estate if the trustee had instead
sold the property, the facts indicated that secured creditors
immediately foreclosed on the property upon its abandonment to
the debtor.' Because foreclosure is a taxable event, the debtors
in those cases were forced to recognize the gain inherent in the
181. Although the stepped-up basis provision had not, in fact, been repealed
when the Commercial Law League presented its proposal to the National Bank-
ruptcy Review Commission in 1997, it had been subject to significant criticism
by tax commentators for years. See supra note 179 and accompanying text.
182. While no empirical studies have been conducted to quantify the revenue
loss resulting from the Commercial Law League's proposal, empirical studies
have indicated that approximately one-half of all capital gains inherent in prop-
erty are never taxed because of the stepped-up basis at death, the provision
upon which the Commercial Law League's proposal is modeled. See, e.g.,
MERVYN A. KING ET AL., THE TAXATION OF INCOME FROM CAPITAL 221 (Mervyn
A. King & Don Fullerton eds., 1984); Cunningham & Schenk, supra note 179, at
344.
183. See Moses, supra note 23, at 220 (noting that if the debtor decides to sell
the property that has been abandoned by the trustee or that has reverted back
to the debtor at the termination of the bankruptcy estate, "it more than likely
would not result in a taxable event or any gain realized would be excluded from
the taxpayers [sic] taxable income," due to "a number of tax code provisions,
such as the 'over 55 exclusion of income,' property being transferred by death,
§ 1031 exchanges, and other legitimate tax saving devices").
184. Samore v. Olson (In re Olson), 930 F.2d 6, 7 (8th Cir. 1991) (per curiam);
Terjen v. Santoro (In re Terjen), 154 B.R. 456, 457 (E.D. Va. 1993), affd, 30 F.3d
131, 131 (4th Cir. 1994) (unpublished table decision); In re Burpo, 148 B.R. 918,
919 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1993); In re A.J. Lane & Co., 133 B.R. 264, 266 (Bankr. D.
Mass. 1991); see also Williams, supra note 58, at 29 ("[Albandonment chiefly
concerns valuable property that is overencumbered with liens. Therefore, once
abandonment occurs, a secured party almost always appears seeking to foreclose
on the property."). For a more comprehensive discussion of the facts underlying
the cases cited in this footnote, see supra notes 63-145 and accompanying text.
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property upon its foreclosure.' Although there is no empirical
evidence to suggest the magnitude of the revenue loss that would
occur if the Commercial Law League's proposal were adopted, the
results of its own study suggest that the numbers would be stag-
gering.18 Accordingly, this stepped-up basis proposal is adminis-
tratively unfeasible and should be rejected as a possible solution
to the abandonment dilemma.
B. THE NATIONAL BANKRUPTCY REVIEW COMMISSION REPORT
As part of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994,187 Congress
established the National Bankruptcy Review Commission to ex-
amine how current bankruptcy law was operating in practice and
to propose specific recommendations for amending the Bank-
ruptcy Code to alleviate problems associated with its practical
application.8 On October 20, 1997, the Commission issued its fi-
nal report to Congress, a section of which was devoted exclusively
to bankruptcy taxation issues.1
89
In addressing the issue of taxation of abandonments in
bankruptcy, the Commission's report recognized that the major-
ity rule established by the courts, that an abandonment is not
treated as a transfer for tax purposes, is unfair to debtors because
it requires them to pay tax on the gain inherent in their property
when it is disposed of without the benefit of net operating losses
and other tax attributes against which to offset the gain.' 90 Con-
versely, the report stated that the current minority rule, that an
abandonment is a taxable event to the bankruptcy estate, requir-
ing the estate to recognize the gain inherent in the property at
the time of abandonment for tax purposes, is unfair to the taxing
authority because it converts what would otherwise be a nondis-
chargeable debt into a dischargeable one, making it less likely
185. See Olson, 930 F.2d at 8; Terjen, 154 B.R. at 459.
186. Recall that the Commercial Law League's empirical study estimated
that over the four-year testing period of the study, nearly $340 million would
have been available to unsecured creditors in the absence of trustee abandon-
ments. Moreover, this number was "exclusive of the potential capital gain taxes
and the obligations owed to the creditors secured by the assets." Commercial
Law League of Am., supra note 24, at 21.
187. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-394, 108 Stat. 4106
(1994).
188. Id. §§ 601-610, 108 Stat. at 4147-50.
189. 1 NAT'L BANKR. REVIEW CoMMN, supra note 156, at 943-80.
190. Id. at 970. For a more comprehensive discussion of the treatment of tax
attributes in bankruptcy, see infra notes 268-76 and accompanying text.
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that the taxing authority will ever recover its claim in full.'9' The
Commission reasoned that, if the debtor had sold or otherwise
disposed of the property just before bankruptcy, he would have
triggered the gain inherent in the property, and the resulting tax
liability would have been a nondischargeable tax in the debtor's
ensuing bankruptcy proceeding.
9 2
Adopting a proposal first suggested by the ABA Task Force,
the Commission proposed that when a trustee abandons property
to the debtor during the administration of a bankruptcy proceed-
ing, the abandonment should be treated as a disposition of the
property by the debtor immediately before bankruptcy. ,93 Thus,
the tax liability resulting from the disposition would be a pre-
petition debt and could be satisfied, at least in part, out of assets
in the bankruptcy estate. Any remaining tax liability would be a
nondischargeable tax and would be the debtor's responsibility.
The Commission's proposal also provided that the debtor's per-
sonal tax liability would not arise until he had actually disposed
of the property, either during or after the bankruptcy proceed-
ing.'94 In support of its proposal, the Commission argued that the
proposal was fair to both the debtor and the taxing authority, be-
cause "[t]he debtor will have a nondischargeable tax liability, the
same as if he had disposed of the asset immediately prior to
bankruptcy, and will not have beaten the system by having the
191. 1 NAT'L BANKR. REvIEW COMM'N, supra note 156, at 970. The report
recognized that the tax liability would be treated as a first priority administra-
tive expense in the debtor's bankruptcy proceeding. See id.
192. Id.; see also 11 U.S.C. §§ 507(a)(8)(A)(i), 523(a)(1) (2000).
193. 1 NATL BANKR. REvIEW COMM'N, supra note 156, at 970. It should be
noted that, although the Commission ultimately adopted the proposal outlined
in the text, it also proffered two contrary proposals that had received some sup-
port by the Commission during its deliberation process. The first contrary pro-
posal was to clarify statutorily the position adopted by a majority of courts that
an abandonment was not a transfer for tax purposes, thereby shifting the tax
liability inherent in the abandoned property from the estate to the debtor. See
id. at 970-71. Proponents of this proposal recognized that the proposal would
have the effect of burdening the debtor's fresh start, but argued that shifting the
tax burden from the estate to the debtor protected creditors, who received no
benefit from the property and who would otherwise be subsidizing the debtor's
fresh start. Id. at 971.
The Commission's second alternative proposal also proposed codifying the
majority rule that an abandonment was not a taxable event, but added that
any tax attributes clearly traceable to the abandoned property should be
transferred with the abandoned property back to the debtor. See id. at 971-72.
The proposal argued that allowing the debtor the benefit of tax attributes as-
sociated with the abandoned property "alleviates the inequity associated with
the majority rule." Id. at 972.
194. Id. at 970.
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gain treated as an administrative expense.,,95
Like the Commercial Law League proposal, the Commis-
sion's proposal raises two major policy concerns. First, it fails to
acknowledge that nearly ninety percent of all chapter 7 consumer
bankruptcy cases are so-called no-asset cases. 96 In these cases,
after (i) secured creditors receive encumbered assets on which
they hold a valid and unavoidable security interest,' 9 and (ii) the
debtor receives assets on which she has claimed a valid exemp-
tion,' there are no assets remaining for distribution to unse-
cured creditors, including priority creditors.' 99 Accordingly, in the
vast majority of chapter 7 cases, none of the tax liability arising
out of the Commission's proposed "disposition by the debtor im-
mediately prior to bankruptcy"200 will be satisfied out of the bank-
ruptcy estate. Thus, the entire tax burden will fall on the debtor,
who will possess no tax attributes against which to offset the li-
ability because the attributes will have all been transferred to the
bankruptcy estate at the commencement of the case.2'
Moreover, the debtor will be burdened with a tremendous
tax liability without having funds available to pay that liability.
As discussed previously, it is a fundamental notion of tax law
that the Tax Code attempts, whenever possible, to match the im-
position of tax with the receipt of funds with which to pay that
195. Id.
196. See TERESA A. SULLIVAN ET AL., AS WE FORGIVE OUR DEBTORS:
BANKRUPTCy AND CONSUMER CREDIT IN AMERICA 203 (1989). Other studies con-
firm this 90% figure. See, e.g., Irving A. Breitowitz, New Developments in Con-
sumer Bankruptcies: Chapter 7 Dismissal on the Basis of "Substantial Abuse"
(pt. 1), 59 AM. BANKR. L.J. 327, 335 (1985) ("[Flor all practical purposes, the pri-
ority and distribution provisions of chapter 7 are virtually a dead letter since, in
over 90% of all cases, there are no assets available for distribution after exemp-
tions are claimed."). Another study found that over 92% of chapter 7 proceedings
were "no asset" cases. Herbert & Pacitti, supra note 25, at 311. For an in-depth
critique of the Sullivan study, see Karen Gross, Re-Vision of the Bankruptcy Sys-
tem: New Images of Individual Debtors, 88 MICH. L. REv. 1506 (1990) (reviewing
SULLIVAN ET AL., supra).
197. See 11 U.S.C. § 506 (2000) (governing secured claims in bankruptcy
generally); see also id. § 522(f) (governing the avoidance of security interests un-
der certain proscribed circumstances).
198. See id. § 522. For a more comprehensive discussion of the exemption
process, see Michelle Arnopol Cecil, Crumbs for Oliver Twist: Resolving the Con-
flict Between Tax and Support Claims in Bankruptcy, 20 VA. TAX REV. 719, 733-
35 (2001).
199. See Cecil, supra note 198, at 767.
200. 1 NATL BANxR. REVIEW COMM'N, supra note 156, at 970.
201. See I.R.C. § 1398(g) (2000); see also infra notes 268-76 and accompany-
ing text (discussing the operation of I.R.C. § 1398(g) in a bankruptcy proceed-
ing).
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tax liability.20 2 Although the Commission's proposal attempts to
address this issue by not imposing tax liability on the debtor until
he sells or otherwise disposes of the property after the trustee has
abandoned it to him, the proposal fails to recognize that most
such dispositions will be the result of a foreclosure on the prop-
- 201
erty by a secured creditor. In foreclosure cases, the debtor
rarely, if ever, receives any cash upon the consummation of the
foreclosure sale. Yet the Commission's proposal would neverthe-
less impose a tax burden on the debtor at the time of the foreclo-
sure sale, with no realistic means available to the debtor with
which to pay the liability. For these reasons, the National Bank-
ruptcy Review Commission's proposal does not offer a viable al-
ternative for addressing the problem of how to tax abandonments
in bankruptcy.
C. THE NATIONAL BANKRUPTCY CONFERENCE PROJECT
A decade after the Bankruptcy Code was enacted in 1978,
the National Bankruptcy Conference 204 undertook a comprehen-
sive review of how the new law was operating in practice. 20 5 Six
years later, in 1994, the Conference released its final report,
which concluded that although the structure and operation of the
Bankruptcy Code were sound overall, a number of bankruptcy
provisions were in need of substantial revision. One such pro
posed revision related to the tax consequences of abandonment in
an individual chapter 7 or 11 bankruptcy proceeding.2 7
The Conference's report first recognized that a savvy debtor
202. See supra note 149 and accompanying text.
203. See, e.g., Samore v. Olson (In re Olson), 930 F.2d 6, 7-8 (8th Cir. 1991)
(per curiam); Terjen v. Santoro (In re Terjen), 154 B.R. 456, 457-58 (E.D. Va.
1993), affd, 30 F.3d 131 (4th Cir. 1994) (unpublished table opinion); In re Burpo,
148 B.R. 918, 919 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1993); In re A.J. Lane & Co., 133 B.R. 264,
266-67 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1991). For a more comprehensive discussion of the
facts underlying these cases, see supra notes 63-145 and accompanying text.
204. The National Bankruptcy Conference is a "voluntary, non-profit, self-
supporting organization of about sixty lawyers, law teachers, and bankruptcy
judges who have achieved scholarly distinction in the field of bankruptcy law. Its
purpose is to study ... the operation of bankruptcy and related laws and to con-
sult with Congress... on needed revisions." Lawrence P. King et al., Foreword
to NAT'L BANKR. CONFERENCE, REFORMING THE BANKRUpTCY CODE: THE
NATIONAL BANKRUPrCY CONFERENCE's CODE REVIEW PROJECT, at I (Final Re-
port 1994).
205. Id. The program was sponsored by the American Law Institute and the
American Bar Association. See NATL BANKR. CONFERENCE, supra note 204, at I.
206. King et al., supra note 204, at II.
207. NAT'L BANKR. CONFERENCE, supra note 204, at 89.
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could shift the tax liability inherent in appreciated property to
the bankruptcy estate merely by filing a bankruptcy petition be-
fore a secured creditor foreclosed on the property.2 °8 The report
also recognized that a well-advised trustee could, under the ma-
jority rule, shift the tax burden back to the debtor simply by
abandoning the property to the debtor before foreclosure.0 9 Argu-
ing that the outcome of such an important tax question should
not turn on which party has more sophisticated tax counsel, the
report proposed that any sale, abandonment, foreclosure, or other
disposition of property occurring as part of an individual chapter
7 or 11 bankruptcy proceeding should be treated as discharge of
indebtedness income.10
The Conference's proposal that taxable gain triggered upon a
disposition of property that occurs as part of a bankruptcy pro-
ceeding be treated as discharge of indebtedness income has con-
siderable merit. Unfortunately, because the Conference's final
report devoted only two pages to this important topic, it left a
host of questions unresolved. For example, which party will bear
the burden of this discharge of indebtedness income, the debtor or
the bankruptcy estate? Moreover, how will the debtor's tax at-
tributes be allocated? Will they remain property of the bank-
ruptcy estate even if it is the debtor who bears ultimate responsi-
bility for the discharge of indebtedness income? Thus, although
the National Bankruptcy Conference's proposal offers a positive
first step toward resolving the dilemma of how to tax abandon-
ments in bankruptcy, it does not go far enough.
D. THE WILLIAMS PROPOSAL
Professor Jack Williams, a prominent bankruptcy taxation
scholar, wrote an article in 1994 addressing the tax consequences
of abandonments in bankruptcy in which he built on the proposal
developed earlier that year by the National Bankruptcy Confer-
208. Id. at 90. The report referred to such encumbered property as a "hot as-
set." Id.
209. Id. The report notes that, even under the majority rule, a trustee cannot
wait until after the property is foreclosed upon, and then abandon the proceeds
from the foreclosure sale back to the debtor. Id. (citing Erickson v. United States
(In re Bentley), 916 F.2d 431 (8th Cir. 1990)). For a discussion of this exception
to the majority rule, see supra note 113 and accompanying text.
210. See id. at 89, 91. Under the proposal, the discharge of indebtedness in-
come would be "subject to exclusion and attribute reduction." Id. at 91. For a
more comprehensive discussion of discharge of indebtedness income generally
and the attribute reduction mentioned in the Conference's proposal, see infra
notes 243-58 and accompanying text.
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ence.21' After adopting the Conference's proposal that income
arising from the abandonment and subsequent foreclosure or
other disposition of property during an individual debtor's chap-
ter 7 or 11 bankruptcy proceeding should be treated as discharge
of indebtedness income for tax purposes, Williams suggested that
the same treatment be afforded to individual debtors in chapter
12 and 13 proceedings as well.212 In support of his proposal, Wil-
liams argued that the tax burden imposed on the debtor was the
same under each chapter and that the debtor's fresh start policy
was equally important in all four types of bankruptcy proceed-
ings.213 Moreover, Williams posited that both bankruptcy and tax
policy favor minimizing the influence that tax law has on a
debtor's selection of the appropriate bankruptcy chapter under
which to seek relief. "By restricting favorable section 108 [dis-
charge of indebtedness] treatment to chapter 7 or 11 cases, the
Conference report conflicts with this policy."
214
Williams also proposed that the Conference proposal be
modified to include insolvent taxpayers who had not filed for
bankruptcy protection, and offered two arguments in support of
this expansion. First, Williams argued that under current law,
special provisions that allow a taxpayer to exclude discharge of
indebtedness income from the taxpayer's gross income apply
equally to insolvent and bankrupt debtors. 15 Second, without a
provision allowing insolvent taxpayers to take advantage of this
exception, many of those taxpayers will be forced to file for bank-
ruptcy protection for tax purposes, in violation of traditional tax
law notions of horizontal equity.
216
Finally, Williams recognized that the Conference proposal
failed to address whether it was the debtor or the bankruptcy es-
tate who was responsible for the discharge of indebtedness in-
come arising out of the sale or disposition of an appreciated asset
211. See Williams, supra note 58, at 55-65.
212. Id. at 59-60.
213. Id. at 59.
214. Id. at 60.
215. See id.; see also I.R.C. § 108 (2000) (describing discharge of indebtedness
income).
216. Williams, supra note 58, at 64. Horizontal equity is satisfied if taxpay-
ers in equal positions are treated equally. 1 RICHARD A. MUSGRAVE, ET, OT and
SBT, in PUBLIC FINANCE IN A DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY 260, 260-61 (1986); see also
S. REP. No. 99-313, at 4 (1986) (discussing fairness in a tax system); Stuart Ro-
sow, The Treasury's Reform Proposals: Not a Fair Tax, 3 YALE L. & POLY REv.
58, 61 (1984) (same).
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during the bankruptcy proceeding. 17 He concluded that if the
disposition, such as a foreclosure, occurred while the asset was
still property of the bankruptcy estate, then it should be the es-
tate that would bear the burden of the discharge of indebtedness
income. Conversely, Williams concluded that if the disposition oc-
curred after abandonment, when the debtor owned the property,
then it should be the debtor who would bear the tax burden of thediscarg of ndeb dnes " 2111
discharge of indebtedness income. In reaching this determina-
tion, Williams adopted the majority view that the trustee's aban-
donment of property to the debtor was not a taxable transfer. 19
To alleviate the problem that the debtor would have discharge of
indebtedness income without the corresponding tax attributes
against which to offset that income, Williams proposed that the
tax attributes that could clearly be associated with the aban-
doned property be transferred from the estate to the debtor at the
time of the abandonment.22 °
217. Williams, supra note 58, at 60.
218. See id. at 61.
219. See id. In support of this position, Williams argued the following:
Bankruptcy abandonment is not an exchange or disposition for tax
purposes; rather, bankruptcy abandonment is a disclaimer by the
trustee of the estate's interest in the abandoned property. The
debtor's interest in the property, which always remained in place
throughout bankruptcy but was subordinate to the estate's judicial
lien, becomes the dominant interest once again.
Id.
220. See id. Williams also suggested that, with respect to tax attributes not
readily associated with a specific piece of property, the Service should propose
regulations that would allocate those tax attributes in a reasonable manner so
that some of those attributes transferred to the debtor with the abandoned prop-
erty. Id. It is interesting to note that the notion that tax attributes associated
with abandoned property be transferred back to the debtor upon abandonment
is not new. In 1992, when the Service promulgated new regulations under sec-
tion 1398 of the Tax Code, the regulations provided that when a trustee aban-
doned an interest in a passive activity or former passive activity to the debtor
during the pendency of a bankruptcy proceeding, that abandonment should not
be treated as a taxable event to the bankruptcy estate. See Treas. Reg. § 1.1398-
1(d)(1) (1994). The regulations further provided that, in such a case, the estate
must transfer to the debtor the unused passive activity loss and credit carry-
overs associated with the abandoned property. See id. § 1.1398-1(d)(2)(i). For a
more comprehensive discussion of these regulations, see Richard M. Lipton,
Proposed 1398 Regulations Raise Conflict Between Debtors and Bankruptcy
Trustees, 79 J. TAX'N 12 (1993).
Williams's article also contained two other minor proposals, only one of
which is relevant to the issue of taxing abandonments in bankruptcy. He sug-
gested that when a bankruptcy trustee files a no-asset report with the court, it
should be treated as an abandonment for tax purposes. See Williams, supra
note 58, at 61-62. In this way, a foreclosure of the debtor's property after the
no-asset report is filed will result in discharge of indebtedness income to the
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Williams's suggestion that the Conference proposal be ex-
tended to debtors who have sought bankruptcy protection under
chapter 12 or 13 of the Bankruptcy Code and to insolvent debtors
not in bankruptcy are both well reasoned and strongly grounded
in bankruptcy and tax policy. Accordingly, the proposal outlined
below will borrow and build upon this idea. On the other hand,
Williams's proposal regarding the transfer of certain tax attrib-
utes back to the debtor upon abandonment is too vague to be use-
ful. This Article will propose a radically different solution to the
vexing issue of how tax attributes should be allocated in a bank-
ruptcy proceeding than any scholarly work or study that has
come before.
V. UNIFYING BANKRUPTCY AND TAX POLICY:
A PROPOSAL FOR CHANGE
Although each of the foregoing proposals provides useful in-
sights into the bankruptcy abandonment issue, they fail to pro-
vide a comprehensive solution to the problem. This Article will
propose a three-pronged approach to the taxation of property
abandonments in a debtor's bankruptcy proceeding. First, it will
argue that the debtor should bear the burden of the tax imposed
on the gain inherent in an asset owned at the commencement of
the bankruptcy case, whether the asset is abandoned by the trus-
tee to the debtor, sold by the trustee for the benefit of unsecured
creditors, or retained by the debtor for his fresh start.221 Second,
the Article will propose that, because the debtor does not have
ready cash available to pay the tax on the inherent gain, the gain
should be treated as discharge of indebtedness income when the
debtor disposes of the asset, either through sale or foreclosure.222
Finally, the Article will suggest that the debtor retain all tax at-
tributes available at the time of the bankruptcy filing so that they
can be used to absorb the discharge of indebtedness income aris-
ing upon the disposition of the asset.223
debtor, not the bankruptcy estate. Id. According to Williams, "[tihis modifica-
tion more accurately reflects the intention and understanding of the parties
involved." Id. at 63.
221. See infra notes 224-30 and accompanying text.
222. This proposal, including a comprehensive explanation of the concept of
cancellation of indebtedness income, is discussed in greater detail infra notes
231-67 and accompanying text.
223. See infra notes 268-78 and accompanying text.
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A. IMPOSING THE TAX BURDEN ON THE DEBTOR
As discussed earlier, traditional tax policy notions suggest
that the taxpayer who has enjoyed the benefits of a property's
appreciation in value should bear the burden of paying the tax on
that appreciation.224 In a bankruptcy proceeding, it is the debtor,
not the bankruptcy estate, who has enjoyed the benefits of the
pre-bankruptcy appreciation inherent in her assets, through the
use and enjoyment of those assets and the ability to use those as-
sets as collateral for a loan. 225 Accordingly, tax policy dictates that
the debtor should bear the burden for the tax imposed on the pre-
bankruptcy appreciation of her assets, irrespective of whether the
property is abandoned to the debtor because it is of inconsequen-
tial value to the estate, sold by the trustee for the benefit of unse-
cured creditors, or retained by the debtor as exempt property
necessary for her fresh start.
Because tax policy dictates that the debtor, rather than the
bankruptcy estate, should bear the burden of any tax imposed on
the pre-petition appreciation inherent in an asset, it follows logi-
cally that the trustee's abandonment of the asset to the debtor
during the bankruptcy proceeding should not constitute a taxable
event. Thus, although A.J. Lane reached the correct conclusion
from a statutory construction standpoint that an abandonment
by the trustee is taxable to the bankruptcy estate, Olson and its
progeny had the better-reasoned argument from a policy perspec-
tive.227 Accordingly, both the Bankruptcy Code and the Tax Code
must be amended to reflect the View that a property abandon-
ment during a bankruptcy proceeding will not be taxable trans-
fer, and thus will not result in any taxable gain to the bankruptcy
estate.
Moreover, because tax policy attempts to match the imposi-
tion of a tax with the taxpayer's ability to pay it,28 the debtor's
224. See, e.g., 1 NAVL BANKR. REVIEW COMM'N, supra note 156, at 971.
225. See id. For example, the taxpayer might use the proceeds of a loan se-
cured by the appreciated property to purchase a yacht or to go on an exotic vaca-
tion, thereby enjoying the benefits of the property's increase in value currently.
Moreover, the taxpayer might use the proceeds of such a loan to add an addition
to an apartment building, thereby generating increased depreciation deductions
annually and reducing the taxpayer's taxable income by a corresponding
amount.
226. For a more complete discussion of the AJ. Lane case, see supra notes
63-99 and accompanying text.
227. See supra notes 114-43 and accompanying text.
228. See OLIVER & PEEL, JR., supra note 149, at 50; U.S. DEPT OF THE
TREASURY, supra note 149, at 81.
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tax liability for pre-bankruptcy appreciation should not arise un-
til a realization event occurs upon a sale or other disposition of
the property.29 For example, the trustee's sale of the property for
the benefit of the estate will trigger the debtor's tax liability.
Similarly, if the property reverts back to the debtor upon aban-
donment by the trustee or is retained by the debtor as exempt
property necessary for his fresh start,23° the debtor's tax liability
will not arise until the debtor sells the property to pay his se-
cured creditors or the property is foreclosed upon by the creditor
upon the debtor's default.
B. TREATING THE RESULTING GAIN AS DISCHARGE OF
INDEBTEDNESS INCOME
The problem with imposing a tax on the debtor upon the
property's sale or other disposition is that the debtor is clearly in
a state of financial distress and may not have ready cash avail-
able to pay the tax, especially if the realization event occurs upon
the property's foreclosure by a secured creditor23' or the trustee's
sale of the property for the benefit of the estate. Accordingly, this
Article builds on the suggestion first proposed by the National
Bankruptcy Conference in 1994 that the tax liability resulting
from an asset's pre-bankruptcy appreciation be treated as dis-
charge of indebtedness income to the debtor.232 This Article's pro-
229. See I.R.C. § 1001(a) (2000).
230. See H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 125 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5963, 6086 ('The two most important aspects of the fresh start available under
the Bankruptcy laws are the provision of adequate property for a return to nor-
mal life, and the discharge.... ."). A debtor is generally entitled to select either
the exemptions of the state in which he resides (together with exemptions estab-
lished under federal nonbankruptcy laws and joint tenancy and tenancy by the
entirety property exempt from the reach of creditors under nonbankruptcy law),
see 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(1), (2) (2000), or the federal exemptions set forth in section
522(d) of the Bankruptcy Code, whichever is more generous. States may, how-
ever, opt out of the federal bankruptcy exemption scheme, in which case the
debtor must use the exemptions provided under the laws of the debtor's state of
residence. See id. § 522(b)(1).
231. In fact, case law suggests that most property dispositions in the bank-
ruptcy context that occur after the bankruptcy trustee has abandoned secured
property to the debtor are the result of a foreclosure on the property by a secured
creditor. See, e.g., Samore v. Olson (In re Olson), 930 F.2d 6, 7 (8th Cir. 1991)
(per curiam); Terjen v. Santoro (In re Terjen), 154 B.R. 456 (E.D. Va. 1993), affd,
30 F.3d 131 (4th Cir. 1994) (unpublished table decision); see also supra notes 63-
145 and accompanying text.
232. See NAT'L BANKR. CONFERENCE, supra note 204, at 89-91. Although the
National Bankruptcy Conference proposed that gain resulting from the disposi-
tion of property in a proceeding be treated as discharge of indebtedness income,
it failed to resolve whether the debtor or bankruptcy estate should bear the bur-
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posal, however, goes much further than any proposal that has
come before, because it applies even in cases in which the trustee
sells an asset that is part of the bankruptcy estate for the benefit
of unsecured creditors rather than abandoning the property to
the debtor or another party with a possessory interest in the
property. As discussed previously, current law provides that if
the bankruptcy trustee sells appreciated property that is part of
the estate, it is the estate, and not the debtor, that must include
the built-in gain inherent in the property in the estate's gross in-
come. 1 3 This Article takes the position that even if the trustee
sells appreciated property for the benefit of unsecured creditors,
the debtor should nonetheless bear the burden of the tax on the
appreciation inherent in the property because again it was the
debtor, and not the unsecured creditors, who enjoyed the pre-
bankruptcy benefits of that appreciation. To find otherwise could
lead to incongruous results. For example, under current law if the
trustee abandons encumbered property back to the debtor, and
that property is later foreclosed upon by the secured creditor to
satisfy its claim, it is the debtor who is responsible for the tax on
the gain inherent in that property.234 Conversely, if the trustee
sells unencumbered property with the same amount of apprecia-
tion for the benefit of unsecured creditors, it is the estate, and not
the debtor, that is responsible for the tax on the same gain.1
31
Shifting the tax burden from the debtor to the estate simply be-
cause the debtor's creditors hold unsecured rather than secured
claims elevates form over substance.236 From a policy perspective,
the debtor should bear the tax burden in both situations because
the debtor enjoyed the benefit of the property's appreciation in
both instances.
Moreover, although a separate taxable entity is created un-
der the Tax Code only in individual chapter 7 and 11 bankruptcy
cases, this Article adopts the suggestion first espoused by Profes-
sor Williams that this discharge of indebtedness treatment apply
den of that tax. See supra note 217 and accompanying text.
233. See S. REP. No. 95-989, at 66 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5787, 5852; see also supra notes 57-58 and accompanying text.
234. See, e.g., Olson, 930 F.2d at 8.
235. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
236. Professor Williams's abandonment proposal adopted this very concept.
He proposed that the estate should bear the burden of the discharge of indebt-
edness income if the asset was sold or disposed of while still property of the es-
tate, but the debtor should bear the tax burden if instead the disposition oc-
curred after abandonment, while the debtor owned the property. See Williams,
supra note 58, at 61; see also supra notes 217-20 and accompanying text.
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equally to debtors in chapter 12 and 13 bankruptcy proceed-
ings,237 as well as to debtors who are insolvent but have not
availed themselves of bankruptcy protection.2 3 As to the sugges-
tion that this favorable tax treatment should apply to debtors fil-
ing chapter 12 and 13 bankruptcy petitions, Williams aptly ar-
gued that the fresh start policy is equally strong in all four types
of bankruptcy proceedings. Williams also suggested that "both
bankruptcy and tax law recognize a strong policy to minimize the
influence of tax consequences in selecting under which chapter an
individual debtor seeks relief."240 To allow a debtor to avail him-
self of the discharge of indebtedness rules only in chapter 7 or 11
defeats this well-established policy. Moreover, this discharge of
indebtedness treatment should apply equally to corporations and
individuals seeking protection under the Bankruptcy Code.
Additionally, discharge of indebtedness treatment should
also be expanded to encompass insolvent debtors not in bank-
ruptcy for two reasons. First, as Williams argued, if this tax
treatment is applicable only in bankruptcy, taxpayers might be
forced to file for bankruptcy protection merely for tax purposes,
which violates traditional tax notions of horizontal equity.241 It
also places an additional strain on the nation's already overbur-
dened bankruptcy courts. Second, current discharge of indebted-
ness rules already apply equally to both insolvent debtors and
those in bankruptcy.
2 42
As discussed in more detail below, treating the gain resulting
from the sale or disposition of an asset as discharge of indebted-
ness income will result in no immediate tax liability to the debtor,
thereby furthering the bankruptcy policy of preserving the
debtor's fresh start. Instead, the tax burden will be postponed un-
237. See supra notes 212-14 and accompanying text. Recall that, although
the abandonment issue arises only in individual chapter 7 and 11 cases, where
the bankruptcy estate is a separate taxable entity, see I.R.C. §§ 1398, 1399
(2000), this Article's solution is far more expansive, and covers situations in
which the trustee in fact sells an asset in the bankruptcy estate for the benefit of
unsecured creditors rather than abandoning it to the debtor.
238. See supra notes 215-16 and accompanying text.
239. Williams, supra note 58, at 59.
240. Id. at 59-60.
241. See supra note 216 and accompanying text; see also 2 FRANK R.
KENNEDY ET AL., KENNEDY, COUNTRYMAN & WILLIAMS ON PARTNERSIPS,
LIMrED LIABILITY ENTITIES AND S CORPORATIONS IN BANKRUPTCY § 13.02, at
13-5 (2000) ("For purposes of bankruptcy taxation, it [horizontal equity] would
seem to mean that nonbankruptey insolvent taxpayers should generally receive
treatment similar to that of insolvent title 11 taxpayers.").
242. See I.R.C. § 108 (2000); see also Williams, supra note 58, at 60.
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til the debtor is better able to meet that tax obligation in the fu-
ture.
1. A Primer on the Discharge of Indebtedness Rules243
Section 61 of the Tax Code requires a taxpayer to include in
gross income "income from whatever source derived."244 The Su-
preme Court has stated that gross income includes any accession
to the taxpayer's wealth. When a taxpayer borrows money, the
loan proceeds are not considered gross income because the tax-
payer acquires a corresponding obligation to repay the borrowed
money and, thus, does not have an accession to wealth.4 If, how-
ever, the taxpayer is relieved of the obligation to repay the bor-
rowed funds, then the taxpayer must include the discharged debt
in her gross income.2 7 This concept, referred to alternatively as
cancellation of indebtedness income or discharge of indebtedness
income, was first recognized in the landmark 1931 Supreme
Court case of United States v. Kirby Lumber Co.248 The policy jus-
tification for including discharge of indebtedness in gross income
243. Much of this subsection was taken from Cecil, supra note 146, at 1006-
07.
244. I.R.C. § 61(a) (2000).
245. See Comm'r v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426, 431 (1955) (noting
that gross income includes all "accessions to wealth, clearly realized, and over
which the taxpayers have complete dominion").
246. See United States v. Rochelle, 384 F.2d 748, 751 (5th Cir. 1967) ("A loan
does not in itself constitute income to the borrower, because whatever temporary
economic benefit he derives from the use of the funds is offset by the correspond-
ing obligation to repay them."); see also Comm'r v. Wilcox, 327 U.S. 404, 408
(1946); Minnis v. Comm'r, 71 T.C. 1049, 1056 (1979); Stayton v. Comm'r, 32
B.T.A. 940, 943 (1935).
247. See United States v. Kirby Lumber Co., 284 U.S. 1, 3 (1931).
248. Id. In Kirby Lumber, Kirby Lumber issued its own bonds for approxi-
mately $12 million and received par value on the sale of the bonds. Id. at 2. Be-
cause of a decline in the value of the bonds later that year, Kirby Lumber repur-
chased some of the bonds for less than par value, with a price differential of
approximately $137,000. Id. The Commissioner sought to tax Kirby Lumber on
the $137,000 amount as an accession to Kirby Lumber's gross income for the
year. See id. Justice Holmes, writing the opinion for the Court, agreed with the
Commissioner, holding that, as a result of the transaction, Kirby Lumber suf-
fered no reduction in its assets and recognized a clear gain. "As a result of its
dealings it made available $137,521.30 assets previously offset by the obligation
of bonds now extinct .... [Kirby Lumber] has realized within the year an acces-
sion to income, if we take words in their plain popular meaning, as they should
be taken here." Id. at 3; see also Haden Co. v. Comm'r, 118 F.2d 285, 286 (5th
Cir. 1941) ("Assets to the extent of $116,906.54, previously offset by liabilities,
were freed from the claims of creditors, and to this extent the petitioner thereby
'realized within the year an accession to income."' (quoting Kirby Lumber, 284
U.S. at 3)).
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enunciated by Justice Holmes in Kirby Lumber was that the tax-
payer experienced an increase in its net worth when its assets
were freed up as a result of extinguishing its liabilities at a dis-
count.249 Although Kirby Lumber's theoretical underpinnings
have been challenged by tax scholars,25° this net worth approach
is consistent with traditional notions of a comprehensive incomeS 25 1
tax base, and the concept of including discharges of indebted-
ness in gross income is now clearly embedded in the income tax
system. 52
The Tax Code offers an exception to the harsh tax conse-
quences of this rule under certain limited circumstances. Section
108(a) of the Code provides that gross income of a taxpayer does
not include any amount that otherwise would be discharge of in-
debtedness income to the taxpayer if the debt discharge occurs
either (i) in a title 11 bankruptcy proceeding, 53 or (ii) while the
249. Kirby Lumber, 284 U.S. at 3. Commentators have often referred to this
policy justification as the balance sheet approach. See, e.g., Peter C. Canellos,
Rethinking the Tax Aspects of Debt Restructuring, 70 TAXES 808, 810 (1992);
Katherine Pratt, Shifting Biases: Troubled Company Debt Restructurings After
the 1993 Tax Act, 68 AM. BANKR. L.J. 23, 26 (1994).
250. See Boris I. Bittker & Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Income from the Dis-
charge of Indebtedness: The Progeny of United States v. Kirby Lumber Co., 66
CAL. L. REV. 1159 (1978) (arguing that cancellation of debt income, sometimes
referred to as COD income, can be justified not under a net worth or freeing of
assets approach, but rather under a tax benefit theory). "[Blorrowed funds are
excluded from gross income when received because of the assumption that they
will be repaid in full.., a tax adjustment is required when this assumption
proves erroneous." Id. at 1165 (citing to cases discussing the tax benefit theory);
see also Theodore P. Seto, The Function of the Discharge of Indebtedness Doc-
trine: Complete Accounting in the Federal Income Tax System, 51 TAx L. REV.
199, 201-06 (1996) (noting that the Supreme Court has recently adopted both
the net worth theory and the tax benefit rationale for COD income in United
States v. Centennial Savings Bank FSB, 499 U.S. 573, 582 (1991)). For a more
complete discussion of the impact of Centennial on the policy underlying COD
income, see Paul J. Sax, Supreme Court Decides Fundamental Debt Discharge,
Loss Realization Issues, 75 J. TAXN 54, 54-56 (1991).
251. For a more detailed discussion of the concept of a comprehensive income
tax base, see supra notes 154-56 and accompanying text.
252. See, e.g., Patricia L. Bryan, Cancellation of Indebtedness by Issuing
Stock in Exchange: Challenging the Congressional Solution to Debt-Equity
Swaps, 63 TEX. L. REV. 89, 96 (1984) ("Although the Court's analysis in Kirby
Lumber... has been criticized by commentators, the correctness of the result
has rarely been doubted." (footnotes omitted)).
253. A taxpayer is entitled to rely on the title 11 exception only if the tax-
payer is under the jurisdiction of a bankruptcy court in a case commenced under
title 11 of the United States Code, and "the discharge of indebtedness is granted
by the court or is pursuant to a plan approved by the court." I.R.C. § 108(d)(2)
(2000).
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taxpayer is insolvent.254 The legislative history of the Bankruptcy
Tax Act of 1980 provides that the policy justification for this rule
is to "preserve the debtor's 'fresh start' after bankruptcy... so
that a debtor coming out of bankruptcy (or an insolvent debtor
outside bankruptcy) is not burdened with an immediate tax li-
ability.,,
255
There is, however, a toll charge exacted from these
bankruptcy and insolvent taxpayers, codified in section 108(b) of
the Code. Section 108(b) provides that the amount excluded from
a taxpayer's gross income by reason of section 108(a) must be ap-
plied to reduce the taxpayer's tax attributes in the following or-
der: net operating losses,256 general business credits, minimum
254. Id. § 108(a)(1). That provision states:
(1) In general
Gross income does not include any amount which (but for this subsec-
tion) would be includible in gross income by reason of the discharge
(in whole or in part) of indebtedness of the taxpayer if-
(A) the discharge occurs in a title 11 case,
(B) the discharge occurs when the taxpayer is insolvent,
(C) the indebtedness discharged is qualified farm indebtedness,
or
(D) in the case of a taxpayer other than a C corporation, the in-
debtedness discharged is qualified real property business
indebtedness.
Id. It should be noted that if this gross income exclusion applies by reason of the
taxpayer's insolvency, § 108(a)(3) provides that the exclusion will only apply to
the extent that the taxpayer is insolvent. Id. § 108(a)(3). Moreover, insolvency is
defined in § 108(d)(3) as "the excess of liabilities over the fair market value of
assets." Id. § 108(d)(3). The determination of insolvency is made by looking at
the taxpayer's assets and liabilities just prior to the debt discharge. Id.
One issue that continues to perplex the courts is whether contingent li-
abilities, such as guarantees, should count as liabilities for purposes of deter-
mining insolvency under I.R.C. § 108(d)(3). In a recent case, Merkel v. Com-
missioner, 109 T.C. 463 (1997), the Tax Court held that only those liabilities
that the taxpayer is likely to be called upon to pay (under a "more probable
than not" standard) would affect the determination of insolvency under section
108(d)(3) of the Code. See id. at 484. For a more comprehensive discussion of
this issue, see Celia R. Clark, COD Income: New Opportunities for Insolvency
Planning After Merkel, 89 J. TAx'N 29 (1998); see also Pratt, supra note 249,
at 28 & n.29.
255. S. REP. No. 96-1035, at 10 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7017,
7025; H.R. REP. No. 96-833, at 9 (1980).
256. Net operating losses, frequently referred to as NOLs, are often the most
valuable assets of a financially troubled corporation because they can shelter its
income from federal income taxes when it emerges from bankruptcy. For a more
comprehensive discussion of the value of NOLs generally, see Arnopol, supra
note 69, at 138-39; see also Valerie E. Burke & Gardner F. Davis, The Forgotten
Asset: Net Operating Losses of the Chapter 11 Corporate Debtor, FLA. B.J., Mar.
1994, at 69, 69 (1994).
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tax credits, capital loss carryovers, the basis of the taxpayer's
property, passive activity loss and credit carryovers, and foreign257 l
tax credit carryovers. The Senate Finance Committee explained
257. I.R.C. § 108(b) (2000). That section provides in pertinent part:
(b) Reduction of Tax Attributes
(1) In general
The amount excluded from gross income under subpara-
graph (A), (B), or (C) of subsection (a)(1) shall be applied to
reduce the tax attributes of the taxpayer as provided in
paragraph (2).
(2) Tax attributes affected; order of reduction
Except as provided in paragraph (5), the reduction referred
to in paragraph (1) shall be made in the following tax at-
tributes in the following order:
(A) NOL
Any net operating loss for the taxable year of the
discharge, and any net operating loss carryover to
such taxable year.
(B) General business credit
Any carryover to or from the taxable year of a dis-
charge of an amount for purposes for determining
the amount allowable as a credit under section 38
(relating to general business credit).
(C) Minimum tax credit
The amount of the minimum tax credit available
under section 53(b) as of the beginning of the tax-
able year immediately following the taxable year of
the discharge.
(D) Capital loss carryovers
Any net capital loss for the taxable year of the dis-
charge, and any capital loss carryover to such tax-
able year under section 1212.
(E) Basis reduction
(i) In general
The basis of the property of the taxpayer.
(ii) Cross reference
For provisions for making the reduction
described in clause (i), see section 1017.
(F) Passive activity loss and credit carryovers
Any passive activity loss or credit carryover of the
taxpayer under section 469(b) from the taxable
year of the discharge.
(G) Foreign tax credit carryovers
Any carryover to or from the taxable year of the
discharge for purposes of determining the amount
of the credit allowable under section 27.
(3) Amount of reduction
(A) In general
Except as provided in subparagraph (B), the reduc-
tions described in paragraph (2) shall be one dollar
for each dollar excluded by subsection (a).
(B) Credit carryover reduction
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that the policy underlying these attribute reduction rules is to al-
low financially distressed debtors to defer including in gross in-
come the income that they realize from discharge of indebted-
ness, but not to allow them to exclude such amounts from income
forever. "[T]he rules of the bill are intended to carry out the Con-
gressional intent of deferring, but eventually collecting within a
The reductions described in subparagraphs (B), (C),
and (G) shall be 33 1/3 cents for each dollar ex-
cluded by subsection (a). The reduction described in
subparagraph (F) in any passive activity credit
carryover shall be 33 113 cents for each dollar ex-
cluded by subsection (a).
Id.
If a taxpayer is required to reduce the basis in her property under
§ 108(b)(2)(E), the basis reduction is capped at the amount by which the ad-
justed basis of the taxpayer's assets exceeds the aggregate amount of her li-
abilities immediately after the debt discharge. See id. § 1017(b)(2). For an in-
depth examination of these tax attribute reduction rules, including the basis
reduction limitation, see Paul H. Asofsky, Discharge of Indebtedness Income in
Bankruptcy After the Bankruptcy Tax Act of 1980, 27 ST. LouIs U. L.J. 583,
587-600 (1983); see also Karrie Bercik, The Tax Consequences of Stock-for-
Debt Exchanges, 11 J.L. & COM. 201, 206-09 (1992).
Alternatively, under § 108(b)(5), a taxpayer can forego reducing her tax
attributes in the prescribed order and instead elect to reduce the basis of her
depreciable property. I.R.C. § 108(b)(5). A taxpayer might choose to make such
an election when, for example, she plans to use her net operating losses in the
near future and preserving the net operating losses would be more beneficial
on an after-tax basis than a reduction in the basis of depreciable property,
which would have the effect of reducing overall depreciation deductions over
an extended period of time. If a taxpayer makes this depreciable property elec-
tion, the basis limitation of § 1017(b)(2) described in the preceding paragraph
does not apply. See I.R.C. § 1017(b)(2). For a more extensive discussion of the
§ 108(b)(5) election, see THOMAS J. CARROLL ET AL., TAX ASPECTS OF
BANKRUPTCY 4.4 (1992). In the case of both the basis reduction required by
§ 108(b)(2)(E) and the alternative depreciable basis election of § 108(b)(5),
regulations have recently been promulgated in final form prescribing the order
in which the basis of the taxpayer's assets must be reduced. For example, the
regulations provide that, in the case of the § 108(b)(2)(E) basis reduction, the
taxpayer must first reduce the basis in his real property held for investment or
used in his trade or business, to the extent that such property secured the dis-
charged indebtedness. The basis of similar personal property is next reduced,
and so on. See Treas. Reg. § 1.1017-1(a) (as amended in 1999). For a more
complete discussion of these complicated new regulations, see Harry C.
Steinmetz & William Morris, Bankruptcy and Insolvency Tax Developments of
1998: A Look Back, AM. BANKR. INST. J., Mar. 1999, at 10, WL 18-MAR
AMBKRIJ 10.
Finally, it is important to note that if the debtor corporation has none of
the tax attributes enumerated in § 108(b)(2) and does not make the deprecia-
ble basis election of § 108(b)(5), there are no tax consequences to the debtor's
discharge of indebtedness. It is not included in the debtor's gross income, nor
does it carry over to future years to reduce tax attributes in those years.
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reasonable period, tax on ordinary income realized from debt dis-
charge."
258
2. Application of the Discharge of Indebtedness Rules to
Bankruptcy Abandonments
To illustrate the application of these complex rules to a typi-
cal case in which the trustee abandons encumbered property to
the debtor because it is burdensome to the bankruptcy estate,
consider the following example. Assume that the debtor files for
bankruptcy protection under chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code.
At the time of filing, the debtor owns an apartment complex
worth $800,000, which has an adjusted basis for tax purposes of
$300,000. The debtor originally purchased the complex for
$800,000, but has been depreciating it for a number of years,
thereby reducing the property's basis to $300,000.259 Thus, the
property has $500,000 of built-in gain as of the filing of the bank-
ruptcy petition. Because all of the gain inherent in the complex is
due to previously taken depreciation deductions, the $500,000
gain will be taxed at a rate of twenty-five percent when the prop-
erty is sold or otherwise disposed of,26 yielding a tax liability of
$125,000. Assume further that the complex is subject to a nonre-
course mortgage of $700,000.
If the trustee sells the property for its fair market value of
$800,000, the proceeds must first be used to pay off the secured
creditor's $700,000 claim. The estate would also face a tax liabil-
ity of $125,000 on the sale, which of course would not only yield
no benefit to the unsecured creditors, but would in fact cost the
estate $25,000 more than the proceeds from the sale of the com-
plex. Thus, the trustee's proper course of action should be to
abandon the apartment complex to the debtor as burdensome to
the bankruptcy estate.26' Under this Article's proposal, this aban-
258. S. REp. No. 96-1035, at 10; H.R. REP. No. 96-833, at 9. This same policy
justification was reiterated in 1993, when, as part of the Omnibus Budget Rec-
onciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66, § 13226, 107 Stat. 312, 488 (1993),
Congress added minimum tax credits and passive activity loss and credit carry-
overs to the list of tax attributes to be reduced by the debtor's discharge of in-
debtedness. Id.
259. Depreciation deductions are considered a recoupment of the taxpayer's
investment, and therefore reduce the adjusted basis of the taxpayer's property.
See I.R.C. § 1016 (2000).
260. The gain is considered unrecaptured § 1250 gain, and is taxed at a rate
of 25% for all taxpayers above the 15% tax bracket. See id. § 1(h)(1)(D), (7)(A);
see also BITTKER ET AL., supra note 49, J 31.02[21[a], at 31-8.
261. See 11 U.S.C. § 554 (2000); see also supra notes 30-37 and accompany-
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donment would not be a taxable event to the estate.262
After the complex revests in the debtor, he is still liable for
the $700,000 mortgage on it, and is considered to be in default on
the mortgage because bankruptcy accelerates all liabilities. 263 Ac
cordingly, the debtor can either sell the complex to satisfy the
mortgage or the secured creditor will foreclose on the property to
satisfy its liability.26 A sale or foreclosure of the complex is a re-
alization event, resulting in $500,000 of discharge of indebted-
ness income to the debtor. Under the Tax Code's complicated dis-
charge of indebtedness provisions, the debtor will not be required
to pay tax on this discharge of indebtedness income immediately
because he is under the jurisdiction of a bankruptcy court in a
chapter 7 proceeding.265 The debtor will, however, be required to
reduce his tax attributes, beginning with his net operating losses,
by this $500,000 amount.266 If he does not have $500,000 in tax
attributes, any remaining discharge of indebtedness amount will
simply disappear without any further adverse tax consequences
to the debtor.
The obvious benefit to this tax treatment from the debtor's
perspective is that he is not faced with an immediate tax liability
without the corresponding assets available to pay that liability.
Yet from the government's perspective, the tax liability is not for-
given, but merely deferred until a time when the debtor is better
ing text.
262. See supra notes 226-27 and accompanying text.
263. See 11 U.S.C. § 101(5)(A) (2000) (defining a claim as a "right to pay-
ment, whether or not such right is reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliqui-
dated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equi-
table, secured or unsecured" (emphasis added)).
264. The debtor has the option of reaffirming his debt with the secured credi-
tor and retaining the property if the creditor agrees to such a reaffirmation
agreement. See id. § 521. Reaffirmation agreements must meet a number of
stringent requirements under the Bankruptcy Code. See id. § 524(c), (d). In a
minority of jurisdictions, the debtor also has the option of retention, which al-
lows a debtor who has remained current on all payments on a secured debt to
retain the property without reaffirming the debt and simply continue to make
payments on that liability. See, e.g., McClellan Fed. Credit Union v. Parker (In
re Parker), 139 F.3d 668, 673 (9th Cir. 1998); Capital Communications Fed.
Credit Union v. Boodrow (In re Boodrow), 126 F.3d 43, 51-53 (2d Cir. 1997);
Home Owners Funding Corp. of Am. v. Belanger (In re Belanger), 962 F.2d 345,
347-49 (4th Cir. 1992); Lowry Fed. Credit Union v. West, 882 F.2d 1543, 1547
(10th Cir. 1989).
265. See I.R.C. § 108(a)(1)(A) (2000); see also supra notes 253-55 and
accompanying text.
266. See I.R.C. § 108(b) (2000). For a more detailed explanation of this tax
attribute reduction rule, see supra notes 256-58 and accompanying text.
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able to pay it. As a simplistic example, assume that the debtor
had accumulated $500,000 of net operating losses prior to bank-
ruptcy. The debtor's $500,000 of discharge of indebtedness in-
come would be offset against those net operating losses, eliminat-
ing them completely. If, in a future year, the debtor earned
$800,000 in wages, he would not be able to reduce his wages by
his $500,000 of net operating losses and thus would be required
to pay tax on the full $800,000 amount. Therefore, the taxing au-
thority would obtain its pound of flesh from the debtor by requir-
ing him to pay tax on $800,000 rather than $300,000 (the wages
less the debtor's net operating losses), thereby taxing the
$500,000 discharge of indebtedness income, but at a time when
the debtor has the funds readily available to pay that tax. This
tax treatment furthers bankruptcy policy by not burdening the
debtor's fresh start with the imposition of a tax liability at a time
when he is unable to satisfy that liability, while at the same time
promoting sound tax policy by not allowing the appreciation in-
herent in an asset to go untaxed simply because a debtor avails
himself of the bankruptcy system.
There is, however, one problem with the foregoing example.
Under current law, the debtor does not retain his tax attributes,
such as net operating losses, when he files for bankruptcy.1
61
Therefore, without a change in the law, the government would
not be able to recoup the tax on discharge of indebtedness income
in an abandonment situation. The following section remedies this
vexing problem.
C. ALLOWING DEBTORS TO RETAIN THEIR TAX ATTRIBUTES IN
BANKRUPTCY
When a debtor files for bankruptcy protection under chapter
7 or chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code, the bankruptcy estate
succeeds to certain enumerated tax attributes of the debtor pur-
suant to section 1398(g) of the Tax Code.268 Under the statute, the
267. I.R.C. § 1398(g) (2000); see also infra notes 268-76 and accompanying
text (discussing tax attributes of debtors in bankruptcy).
268. See I.R.C. § 1398(a), (g) (2000). Various "tax attributes" are defined in
I.R.C. § 381. One noted bankruptcy tax scholar has argued that section 541 of
the Bankruptcy Code already provides that the debtor's tax attributes transfer
to the bankruptcy estate; thus, the primary purpose of section 1398 of the Tax
Code is to limit the tax attributes to which the estate succeeds by enumerating
only certain attributes that pass to the estate, thereby allowing the debtor to re-
tain all remaining tax attributes for his fresh start. See Jack F. Williams, The
Federal Income Tax Consequences of Individual Debtor Chapter 11 Cases, 46
S.C. L. REv. 1203, 1232-33 (1995).
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enumerated attributes include four sets of tax losses and credits
that the debtor was unable to utilize in previous years to offset
her income tax liability in those years: net operating loss carry-
overs, charitable contribution carryovers, tax credit carryovers,
and capital loss carryovers. 28 9 The transferred attributes also in-
clude the debtor's method of accounting (usually cash or ac-
crual),27° her basis and holding period in her assets, as well as the
character of those assets (ordinary or capital), and any recovery
of tax benefit items to which the debtor is entitled.27' In addition,
269. See I.R.C. § 1398(g)(1), (2), (4), (5). Net operating loss carryovers are
governed by I.R.C. § 172; charitable contribution carryovers are determined un-
der I.R.C. § 170(d)(1); and capital loss carryovers are calculated under I.R.C.
§ 1212.
270. Although the Tax Code requires the estate to adopt the accounting
method used by the debtor, there is no requirement that the estate adopt the
debtor's taxable year. According to two noted bankruptcy scholars, this omission
appears to be intentional, because an earlier version of § 1398 required the es-
tate to succeed to the debtor's taxable year, but that provision was dropped in
the final version of the legislation. See GRANT W. NEWTON & GILBERT D.
BLOOM, BANKRupTcy AND INSOLVENCY TAXATION § 4.5, at 112-13 (2d ed. 1994).
Moreover, the bankruptcy estate is entitled to change its accounting period once
without obtaining prior consent from the Service. I.R.C. § 1398(j)(1) (2000). For a
more comprehensive discussion of this election, see 15 SHEINFELD ET AL., supra
note 35, TX2.04[2], at TX2-23, -24.
271. See I.R.C. § 1398(g)(3), (6), (7). Section 111 of the Code establishes the
extent to which a taxpayer is entitled to recover a tax benefit item. Id. § 111.
One example of a tax benefit item to which the debtor may be entitled is a re-
fund of state income taxes from a year prior to the year in which the debtor filed
bankruptcy. See 15 SHEINFELD ET AL., supra note 35, T TX2.04[21, at TX2-23.
The statute also authorizes the Secretary of the Treasury to establish
regulations requiring that other tax attributes of the debtor be transferred to
the estate upon the commencement of a bankruptcy proceeding. I.R.C.
§ 1398(g)(8). The legislative history to § 1398(g) provides an example, suggest-
ing that "the regulations could allow the estate the benefit of section 1341 of
the Code if the estate repays income which the debtor received under claim of
right." S. REP. No. 96-1035, at 28 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.SC.C.A.N. 7017,
7043. The Treasury Department has not yet promulgated regulations includ-
ing a debtor's claim of right as a tax attribute that transfers to the bankruptcy
estate upon the commencement of the case, and courts have refused to allow
the statute to be interpreted to include claim of right as a transferrable tax
attribute. DiStasio v. United States, 22 Cl. Ct. 36, 51-52 (1990). In fact, courts
have interpreted the statute quite literally to disallow the transfer of any tax
attributes from the debtor to the bankruptcy estate other than those specifi-
cally enumerated in the statute or accompanying treasury regulations. See,
e.g., Rueter v. Robinson (In re Rueter), 158 B.R. 163, 167 (N.D. Cal. 1993)
(mem.); Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of D.F. Antonelli v. United
States (In re Antonelli), 150 B.R. 364, 366-67 (Bankr. D. Md. 1992) (mem.).
For an argument that nonenumerated tax attributes should become part of the
debtor's bankruptcy estate, see 15 SHEINFELD ET AL., supra note 35,
TX2.04[2], at TX2-26 to -29.
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under treasury regulations promulgated in 1992, the bankruptcy
estate also succeeds to the debtor's passive activity loss and credit
carryovers, as well as the debtor's unused at-risk losses. ' Any
transfer of tax attributes from the debtor to her bankruptcy es-
tate is deemed to occur as of the first day of the taxable year in
which the debtor files for bankruptcy protection.273
This transfer of tax attributes from the debtor to her estate
leads to two obvious results. First, the estate can reduce its in-
come tax liability through its use of the debtor's loss and credit
carryovers. Second, the debtor no longer has those tax attributes
available to reduce her tax liability after the commencement of
the bankruptcy case.274 Although the debtor will succeed to the
estate's unused tax attributes upon the termination of the bank-
275 loe
ruptcy estate, she loses any benefit from those tax attributes
during the pendency of the proceeding, thereby impeding her
fresh start after bankruptcy.
276
Moreover, because all of the enumerated tax attributes
transfer to the estate as of the commencement of the debtor's
bankruptcy proceeding, the debtor will not have any tax attrib-
utes available to be reduced by the amount of her discharge of
indebtedness income discussed above. Recall that discharge in-
debtedness income disappears with no tax consequences to the
debtor if the debtor has no tax attributes available for reduc-
tion.77 Such a result would run contrary to traditional notions
of tax and bankruptcy policy because the government would
272. See Treas. Reg. §§ 1.1398-1(c), 1.1398-2(c) (1994). Unused passive activ-
ity losses and credits are defined in I.R.C. § 469(d)(1)-(2), and unused at-risk
losses, referred to in the regulations as unused section 465 losses, are governed
by I.R.C. § 465. The Treasury Department has also issued proposed regulations
providing that the debtor's election to exclude from income gain from the sale of
a principal residence is a tax attribute that transfers to the bankruptcy estate
upon commencement of the case. Treas. Reg. § 1.1398-3 (2002) ("The bankruptcy
estate succeeds to and takes into account the section 121 exclusion with respect
to the property transferred into the estate."); see also I.R.C. § 121 (2000).
273. I.R.C. § 1398(g).
274. See, e.g., MCQUEEN & WILLIAMS, supra note 30, § 24:4, at 24-6.
275. I.R.C. § 1398(i) (2000). The attributes to which the debtor succeeds as of
the termination of the estate are identical to those to which the estate succeeds
at the beginning of the bankruptcy proceeding, with one notable exception. The
debtor does not succeed to the method of accounting used by the bankruptcy es-
tate. See I.R.C. § 1398(i); see also NEWTON & BLOOM, supra note 270, § 4.16, at
142. Moreover, regulations provide that the debtor succeeds to the estate's un-
used passive activity loss and credit carryovers, as well as its unused at-risk
losses. See Treas. Reg. §§ 1.1398-1(e), 1.1398-2(e) (1994).
276. See, e.g., Williams, supra note 28, at 183-84.
277. See supra note 257.
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lose the revenue generated by the pre-tax appreciation in the
debtor's assets simply because the debtor filed for bankruptcy
protection.
Accordingly, under this Article's proposal, the law should be
amended so that the debtor retains the tax attributes arising be-
fore the filing of her bankruptcy petition that would otherwise
pass to the estate under section 1398(g) of the Tax Code.278 Thus,
when the debtor recognizes discharge of indebtedness income
upon the sale or other disposition of an asset during bankruptcy,
her tax attributes will be reduced by the amount of such income.
This proposal can be justified from a tax policy perspective be-
cause it merely defers the recognition of this discharge of indebt-
edness income rather than excluding the income from tax forever.
D. POTENTIAL CRITICISMS OF THE PROPOSAL
Like any other proposed change in the law, this new para-
digm for the tax treatment of abandonments in bankruptcy could
be subjected to criticism. The two major criticisms that might be
waged against this proposal are that it addresses only pre-
appreciation gain and that it disfavors the debtor by offsetting
tax attributes that could otherwise reduce ordinary income by an
amount that would generally be treated as capital gain. This sec-
tion of the Article addresses these potential criticisms.
With respect to the pre-appreciation gain issue, recall that,
upon the creation of a bankruptcy estate, all of the debtor's assets
owned as of the commencement of the bankruptcy case transfer
to that estate by operation of law.19 The bankruptcy judge then
values each of these assets for purposes of the bankruptcy pro-
ceeding. Accordingly, upon the sale or other disposition of an es-
tate asset during the proceeding, the resulting gain can easily be
divided into pre-petition appreciation and post-petition apprecia-
tion, based on the valuation assigned to such asset at the com-
mencement of the case. As suggested previously, the pre-
bankruptcy appreciation is taxed to the debtor as discharge of in-
278. Professor Williams's proposal suggested that only those tax attributes
attributable to properties creating the pre-appreciation gain be retained by the
debtor to offset against discharge of indebtedness income. See supra note 220
and accompanying text. Although Professor Williams recognized the unfairness
of charging the debtor with discharge of indebtedness income without giving the
debtor tax attributes to be reduced by that income, his proposal did not go far
enough in resolving the issue.
279. See 11 U.S.C. § 541 (2000); see also supra notes 54-56 and accompany-
ing text.
780 [Vol 88:723
ABANDONMENTS IN BANKRUPTCY
debtedness income. With respect to post-petition appreciation of
an asset, this Article proposes that that appreciation be taxed to
the debtor as discharge of indebtedness income if the debtor re-
tains the asset as exempt property or the asset reverts back to
the debtor upon its abandonment by the trustee. Alternatively,
the Article suggests that the post-petition gain should be taxed to
the estate if the estate sells the asset for the benefit of unsecured
creditors. This bifurcated scheme simply comports with the fun-
damental notion of tax policy that the taxpayer who enjoys the
benefits of an asset's appreciation in value bear the burden of the
tax attributable to that appreciation.280
With respect to the proposal's second potential criticism, it is
important to recognize at the outset that the gain arising from
the sale or other disposition of a debtor's assets in bankruptcy
would, in most circumstances, constitute capital gain.28 ' Because
this gain will be treated as discharge of indebtedness income un-
der this Article's proposal, the gain will reduce the debtor's net
operating losses and other tax attributes that could otherwise off-
set ordinary income. Critics might argue that such tax treatment
is unfair to the debtor because it forces the debtor to reduce these
valuable tax attributes by capital gain that would ordinarily be
taxed at preferential rates."
The response to this criticism is twofold. First, this problem
already exists with respect to discharge of indebtedness income
under current law because such income reduces a debtor's basis
in his assets (among other tax attributes), thereby converting
what would otherwise be ordinary income into capital gain as a
280. See supra note 163 and accompanying text.
281. Gain on the sale or other disposition of an asset will constitute capital
gain if two requirements are met. First, the asset must be a capital asset in the
hands of the taxpayer. See I.R.C. § 1222(1)-(4) (2000). For a definition of what
items of property constitute capital assets, see id. § 1221. Second, there must be
a sale or exchange of that capital asset. See id. § 1222(1)-(4). There is, however,
an exception to the general rule that the sale or exchange of a capital asset will
give rise to capital gain. Under the rules of recapture, gain on the sale of per-
sonal property will be treated as ordinary income, rather than capital gain, in an
amount equal to the depreciation deductions previously taken with respect to
the property. See id. § 1245(a). Similarly, gain on the sale of real property will be
treated as ordinary income in an amount equal to the excess of accelerated de-
preciation deductions taken with respect to the property over straight-line de-
preciation. See id. § 1250(a). Because most real property must now be depreci-
ated using the straight-line method, however, see id. § 168(b)(3), there is little
recapture income created on the sale of real property under the current Tax
Code.
282. Of course, only long-term capital gain is taxed at preferential rates. See
id. §§ 1(h), 1222(11).
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result of this reduction of basis. Although critics can argue that
this conversion of ordinary income into capital gain is beneficial
to the debtor, this example illustrates the mismatching that al-
ready exists. Moreover, offsetting capital gain against tax attrib-
utes that would otherwise reduce ordinary income is simply nec-
essary to unify bankruptcy and tax policy without adding undue
complexity to the tax system.
CONCLUSION
The three-pronged proposal outlined in this Article provides
a comprehensive solution to the vexing problem of the tax treat-
ment of abandonments in bankruptcy by harmonizing competing
tax and bankruptcy policies. Tax policy is furthered because tax
is imposed on the taxpayer who enjoyed the benefits of the appre-
ciation inherent in the property, irrespective of whether that
property is retained by the debtor for her fresh start, abandoned
by the trustee as burdensome to the bankruptcy estate, or sold by
the trustee for the benefit of creditors. Similarly, the proposal ad-
vances sound bankruptcy policy by postponing the debtor's tax
burden until a time when she has funds available to meet that
tax burden, thereby preserving her fresh start after bankruptcy
to the greatest extent possible. At the same time, the proposal
furthers the bankruptcy policy of providing a fair and equitable
distribution to unsecured creditors by not burdening the bank-
ruptcy estate with taxes from the sale or disposition of an asset
that does not inure to the creditors' benefit economically. Con-
gressional adoption of this comprehensive paradigm will bring
the bankruptcy system one step closer to operating efficiently and
effectively during these difficult economic times.
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